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TURBULENCE AROUND PATRIOTISM: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

The aim of the article is to determine the place of patriotism among other universal values and a philosophical reflection on its current formula. The analysis is based on the classical philosophy of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, J. Maritain, E. Gilson, J. Woroniecki, J. M. I. Bocheński, M. A. Krąpiec and John Paul II. The article consists of two parts. Part 1 poses several questions concerning patriotism in the light of ongoing cultural transformations. Part 2 deals with patriotism as a virtue according to classical ethics to propose answers to these questions.

Keywords: patriotism, homeland, virtue, morality

ZAWIROWANIA WOKÓŁ PATRIOTYZMU. PERSPEKTYWA FILOZOFICZNA

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu jest określenie miejsca patriotyzmu wśród innych wartości uniwersalnych oraz refleksja filozoficzna nad jego aktualną formułą. Analizę prowadzi się w oparciu o filozofię klasyczną (Arystotelesa, Tomasza z Akwinu, J. Maritaina, E. Gilsona, J. Woronieckiego, J. M. I. Bocheńskiego, M. A. Krąpca, Jana Pawła II). Artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W części 1 zostaje postawionych kilka pytań na temat patriotyzmu w związku z trwającymi przemianami kulturowymi. W części 2, aby zaproponować odpowiedzi na te pytania, rozważa się patriotyzm jako cnotę w nawiązaniu do klasycznej etyki.

Słowa kluczowe: patriotyzm, ojczyzna, cnota, moralność

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of the paper is to determine the place of patriotism among other universal values. Patriotism understood as an attitude of an individual or a group of people may, of course, be studied with the use of methods derived from the humanities or social sciences. However, one of the most suitable tools is philosophy which is a reflection aimed at explaining the ontological foundations of the investigated facts. Philosophical reflection on the essence of patriotism allows us to put in order all the aspects of this social phenomenon outlined in multidisciplinary research. This paper consists of two parts: Part 1 presents several questions which may be asked today in relation to patriotism and Part 2 discusses the moral dimensions of patriotism in order to indicate where to look for answers to the above questions. The latter part is based on the texts of such authors representing the tradition of the realistic philosophy as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson and modern Polish thinkers: Jacek Woroniecki,² Józef M. I. Bocheński³ and the representatives of the Polish School of Classical Philosophy.⁴ The texts of John Paul II are also mentioned.

The paper presents a sample of Polish philosophical thought on patriotism, when this issue again has become the subject of discussion in many countries⁵. The reference point in this debate was a lecture of Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), who critically argued against proponents of modern liberal morality claiming that patriotism is rather a vice than a virtue. This American philosopher defined patriotism in terms of a kind of loyalty to a particular nation (MacIntyre 1984, 4). Although he emphasizes that this definition is formulated on behalf of Aristotelian philosophy, he does not give full details about patriotism as a virtue articulated in this philosophical tradition. My article explores them.

² Jacek Woroniecki OP (1878-1949), Professor of *Angelicum* in Rome and Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, Thomist philosopher, theologian and educator. The publication of his extensive work on ethics was suspended by communists until 1986.

³ Józef Maria Inocenty Bocheński OP (1902-1995), Rector of the University of Freiburg, sovietologist, logician and analytic philosopher.

⁴ The Polish School of Classical Philosophy continues the tradition of ancient and medieval philosophers, primarily Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. The School goes back to the late 1940s when after World War II, the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) became a Mecca for researchers that represented realistic philosophical thought (Krapiec and Maryniarczyk 2010). Among the most important philosophers were the Rector of KUL Mieczysław Albert Krapiec (1921-2008) and Karol Wojtyła (1920-2005), the future pope (John Paul II).

⁵ There is now a lively philosophical debate about the moral aspects of patriotism and a deliberate seeking of the ethos of a well-functioning polity as an alternative to nationalism. See e.g.: *The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate* (Kleinig, Keller and Primoratz 2015).

1. QUESTIONS RELATED TO PATRIOTISM

Patriotism used to be, and for some remains, an important factor in the socialisation of the individual and realisation of their own humanity (Skorowski 2006, 363; MacIntyre 1984, 10). However, one may ask in this context whether in the light of the current civilisation changes patriotism is absolutely necessary or perhaps it may be replaced by other factors.

Today, we are witnessing the processes of integration, mingling of cultures, religions, nationalities. People tend to concentrate on their own problems and preferences rather than on social issues. The changes in morality have resulted in weakening national bonds as well as understanding of the notion of citizenship. Today, the development of civil society is not so closely connected with national state as it used to be. For some time, the idea of new individualism has been an important stimulator of the social change (Heywood 2009, 38-41), which has given rise to questioning the notion that society should be perceived as a whole (the basic point of reference for patriotic attitudes) or even made people distrust a community by definition.

Also, it is worthwhile to look at patriotism in the context of localism, i.e., granting significance to small communities, widely promoted today. Without empirical studies, it is difficult to estimate whether “little homelands” have indeed replaced in the social awareness the traditional homeland understood as a national and state community. However, the change of meaning can be seen even at the purely semantic level: the notions “homeland” and “little homeland” are not equivocal. It should be asked in this context if local patriotism is to represent national or republican attitudes, or to replace them.

The next question concerns the processes of European integration and globalisation, which began after World War II. For example, Anthony Giddens writes about the cosmopolitanism imperative which requires a modern European to be able to live in the globalised world where disparate beliefs and ways of life co-exist (Giddens, 2014, 147-216). Undoubtedly, globalisation is changing the understanding of the nation and the nature of such nation-making factors as culture, a national market, territory, and the state. It results in internationalisation of the economy, loss of importance of borders and sovereignty of states whereas culture is becoming transnational (Heywood 2009, 109-111; Krzysztofek and Szczepański 2005, 247). These changes make us reflect on patriotism and the necessity of redefining this notion. Such attempts have already been made. For example, a German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas said that in the times of globalisation (and multiculturalism) patriotism loses its cultural character and becomes a legal-constitutional term (referring not to the ethno-cultural difference but shared citizenship, rights, administrative and political institutions) (Habermas 1993, 25-26).

The post-war discussions of German intellectuals, focused on the problem of Germany's responsibility for World War II, inspired a search for a new principle of

the national identity of the Germans (Kobyliński 2017, 45-47). It began to be seen in democratic values, and not as before, in the concept of a nation. The concept of constitutional patriotism oriented towards the state and its institutions was initially developed (Dolf Sternberger) in the 1960s. It began to gain its final shape in the 1980s in the research of Jürgen Habermas, and, after having passed a kind of test in the early 1990s following the unification of East and West Germany, it became the project of universal importance. While developing his concept, Habermas began to present it as interesting for the organization of modern societies whose stability, due to the cultural and religious differences of their members, should be based not on tradition, but on law (constitutional state of law).

Due to changes in the political system in Poland and its accession to the EU, the subject of patriotism has become of great import also for the Polish society (see, e.g.: Król 2004). It should be noted, however, that for Poles tradition-oriented patriotism, whose foundations were rooted in Christian values, was a matter of national existence. Poles' cultural identity helped them survive as a nation despite the imperialist policies of Germany and Russia in the 19th century. In patriotism oriented towards traditional values, the Poles found the strength to oppose German nationalism and Bolshevism during World War II. After the war, guarding these values, they did not succumb to Sovietization when, as a result of the Yalta Conference (1945), Poland found itself under Soviet occupation for over 40 years.

As can be seen, a discussion about the modern formula of patriotism should start with the question about the essence of patriotism. Is patriotism good or bad? Considering its validity, it is necessary to remember that the globalisation processes have been an object of criticism. For example, David C. Korten, an American economist, believes that globalisation leads to the erosion of the civil society, weakens the national state at the international arena, and destroys social solidarity, at the same time violating the basic principles of justice (Korten 2002, 29-96). Also, Krzysztofek and Szczepański, Polish sociologists, say that globalisation incites what we call "nationalism" or "ethnocentrism" and this co-occurs, paradoxically, with the decreasing importance of nations, their cultures, and traditions, which are superseded by global culture (Krzysztofek and Szczepański 2005, 266).

The criticism of the globalisation processes is accompanied by the prediction that a strong state community will arise to counterweight the interests of international corporations, and this again gives rise to the question about the definition of patriotism. Will the patriotism of the future concern national states or larger international formations such as the European Union? Such a wish was expressed by Winston Churchill in his speech made on September 19th, 1946, when he called for the creation of a unified Europe and formation of close civic and patriotic bonds between its nations (Giddens 2014, 9-10). After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which called the European Union into existence, Jürgen Habermas investigated the problem of national identity and the EU citizenship. As a result, he proposed the above-mentioned project of constitutional patriotism

(Habermas 1993, 26). At present the process of European integration undergoes a crisis. Even the well-known Euro-enthusiast, Anthony Giddens, notices that despite the many successes of the EU, its citizens do not feel an emotional bond with it (Giddens 2014, 147-216). Will the vision of the European patriotism, suggested by Winston Churchill, never materialise? Or perhaps this new patriotism cannot exist in any broader, supra-national and supra-state, dimension? And if it did, what would its meaning be?

Most probably, it should be addressed to some transboundary/cross-border homeland made of traditions, customs, and the values inspiring them. This means it would produce a form of a universal culture. However, the questions arises about the canon of values which that universal culture would be build upon. For centuries, the canon for the European culture was determined by Christian values with the main principle of the love of neighbour. As the modern Europe gradually loses understanding of its cultural roots and does not wish to remember them, the words from the Preamble to the *EU Charter of Fundamental Rights* (Nice December 7th, 2000) about universal values such as human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity must sound unclear for its members (similarly, the term "person" inspires doubt). It should be remembered, that each of these values mentioned in the *Charter* has its historical sources in the Christian concept of the human. What is the spiritual home of a modern European to be like if these main forces in the process of education to values: the Church, nation, family, are losing in importance?

2. VIRTUE OF PATRIOTISM

According to classical ethics⁶, patriotism is considered as moral fitness and belongs to one of the four cardinal virtues. In the historical perspective, teaching about the cardinal virtues was the earliest education in pedagogy. It arose from the theoretical reflection on the existence and especially, metaphysical anthropology (Aristotle 1999, Krąpiec 1983; Krąpiec 2000; Jaroszyński and Anderson 2003). Like the whole sphere of human physical, emotional and intellectual life, human activity, conscious and voluntary, must develop. The ability to act independently was thus considered by the classics as the main aim of education. All the aspects of moral fitness were geared to promote the objective good of a person and the ability to manage one's feelings. The four cardinal virtues (temperance, fortitude, prudence and justice) represent the foundation of natural morality: they can be practised by anyone. It should be added that social engagement, including the civic attitudes, is perceived in classical philosophy as the outcome of this process of formation.

⁶ I use the word "classical" with reference to the philosophy of Antiquity and Scholasticism (mainly to the texts of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas) and neo-Thomism (e.g. the Polish School of Classical Philosophy). In this sense I use the terms "classical ethics", "classical anthropology", "classical metaphysics", "classical philosophy" or "classics". The ethics of the American philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre is close to this understanding.

Patriotism understood as a virtue is composed of 3 elements: psychical love (patriotic feelings), justice and reverence, understood not only as respect but mainly as service (Woroniecki 1986, vol. II-2, 123). It should be noted that classical anthropology understands the human being as composed of the body and soul. Although virtue is spiritual, it integrates the action of man as a whole and materializes in human attitudes, e.g. to the homeland. Therefore, these three elements mentioned above are considered to be the virtue of patriotism. I will discuss each of them separately.

2.1. Psychical Love (Patriotic Feelings)

As I noted in my other article on patriotism, the patriotic attitude, like other moral attitudes, involves the stirring of the senses, i.e., feelings (Boużyk 2017, 199). This component plays such an important part in patriotism that we not only speak about patriotic feelings but, especially in the Anglo-Saxon literature, patriotism is defined as a feeling (Heywood 2007, 176). However, each of the elements of moral fitness, and patriotism is one, according to classical ethics, arises from the spirit of freedom, which comes to life as a result of “work with feelings”. The sphere of feelings is indeed considerable in patriotic attitudes. It was very well described by Clive S. Lewis in his book *The Four Loves* as a kind of love which may be called love of “what is mine” or a specific kind of familiarity (Lewis 1993, 33-43). As I wrote in my article mentioned above: “The author meant the emotional bond not only with the home but with all that is near it and what we treat as an inalienable part of our existence in the world. We experience this, e.g., with respect to our neighbours, well known views, smells, and tastes, a certain lifestyle, or the local dialect. It is also inspired by the imagination-stimulating stories about the old days. It may be assumed that this is a sensual affection to territorially, culturally, and temporarily “extended” home. Lewis understood the importance of this feeling for shaping the pro-social attitudes, i.e., extending the sphere of family egoism. However, he warned that left to itself without a context, it may become an object of ideological manipulation and mutate into, as he called it, the “demon of patriotism”. He included in the latter: nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism” (Boużyk 2017, 200-201). Similar comments are made by McIntyre, who notes that patriotism cannot be confused with a mindless loyalty to one’s own particular nation and points out that patriotism is, to some extent, a morally dangerous phenomenon (MacIntyre 1984, 4, 15-16).

Thus, in order to manage patriotic feelings correctly, it is necessary to understand the objective personal good (*bonum honestum*). This idea can be found in classical ethics defining the essence of education as teaching to manage one’s feelings so that we should control them rather than they should control us (Woroniecki 1986, vol. II-2, 123; Bocheński 1989, 11, 23-29). It is significant that John Paul II, when it comes to the problem of patriotism, first explained the essence of freedom and love as attitudes that are embodied in virtues (John Paul II 2005,

47-49). Another important claim in this classical anthropology is the possibility to develop love in a person: moving from egoistic attitudes to the recognition of the importance of shared causes (this process may be reflected in patriotic attitudes). According to the Pope, the modern ideologies of individualism and utilitarianism hinder the development of authentic love, including patriotism (John Paul II 2005, 44-46). This is because they change the hierarchy of goods: *bonum utile* and *bonum delectabile* precede *bonum honestum*. Liberal morality, referring to MacIntyre, tends towards the dissolution of social bonds (MacIntyre 1984, 10).

2.2. Justice (*iustitia legalis*)

It is necessary to note that the virtue of justice, and patriotism as a part of it, concerns human relations. Whereas other cardinal virtues: temperance, fortitude, and prudence are related to our own needs, justice concerns our obligations towards the others (Gilson 1952; Thomas Aquinas 1981; Woroniecki 1986; Jaroszyński and Anderson 2003). It is the permanent readiness (improvement) of the human will to take into consideration the rights of other people or social groups. Patriotism is the central part of the virtue of justice, so-called *iustitia legalis* (the common/general/social form of justice), which is responsible for making our will (note: not feelings!) sensitive to our social duties. Bocheński points out that a good patriot is not the one who has the hottest feelings, but who has the strong will to perform a patriotic duty (Bocheński 1989, 11). Such an interpretation of patriotism is a logical consequence of the concept of *iustitia legalis*. This form of justice is defined as a co-operation of the members of the community for the common good and is the most perfect model of a moral life “above which there is nothing in the natural life and in the supernatural life only the Christian love” (Woroniecki 1986, vol. II-2, 76).

It should be also stressed that the virtue of justice (and thus patriotism) requires at least elementary moral integrity. There is no just action without courage, moderation without prudence, and there are no patriotic attitudes without the ability to control the basic drives and shaping just moral conscience. True patriotism requires work on self-improvement and thus helps to make a human being more aware of own value as a person (Bouzyk 2017, 203). So, being a patriot is inalienably connected with work on one's own character based on understanding the objective good of man. Consequently, patriotism interpreted in this way cannot be linked to totalitarian regimes, because under these regimes an individual is subordinate to the community. There is always the danger of misuse of patriotism for political purposes. So did the communist authorities in Poland (Korkuć 2006, 177-198, Matyja 2006, 232-253). Nazism, nationalism and imperialist ideologies, creating a kind of mythology of some nations and cultures, also soiled the very idea of patriotism. Therefore, it is important to distinguish what patriotism is and what it is not.

It is crucial for this work is to consider the ontic basis of patriotism as a moral value. It requires, on the one hand, objective knowledge about the value of human

being and the meaning of human life, and, on the other hand, the explanation of the very notion of homeland. According to Woroniecki, Bocheński and John Paul II, homeland is a complex being. Using the terms of classical metaphysics, there are two kinds of elements in it: a material element (i.e. land, statehood, history, people, and above all, culture) and a formal one (i.e. that someone is and that he/she is who he/she is) which “binds” that material element in one entity and imposes a moral obligation. In other words, the material element of homeland (as a being) must be considered as the source of man’s physical and spiritual existence (Bocheński 1989, 9). One should recall here John Paul II’s reflection about the definition of homeland understood as heritage of one’s ancestors, namely a set of material and spiritual goods developed by men at a certain territory and in a certain time. The depositor and transferor of the values is the nation: in social relations (within the nation) man is born for his personal human life (John Paul II 2005, 66-67). To this national community (to the past and the future generations as well) man has patriotic responsibilities. The nation is a natural community, not conventional. Therefore, it cannot be replaced by a state or international organization (John Paul II 2005, 74).

Let us remember, that according to classical philosophy the nation as a being does not exist by itself, but it is formed by individuals who build a community through their efforts, particularly – through moral acts (Maritain 1951, Krąpiec 1998). Since integral human development involves moral maturity, one needs to know the values and patterns of moral conduct, i.e. national culture. No family, municipality, district or even Europe have such an impact on human spiritual development as native culture (Bocheński 1989, 14). Therefore, the homeland in the strict sense of the word is a particular national culture: customs, morals and values. As Bocheński noted in his treatise on patriotism, which he wrote during World War II, it is not enough to define the homeland by the factor of citizenship or race (Bocheński 1989, 9-10). The current difficulties in European integration confirm the importance of his words. Perhaps the lack of European patriotism is a consequence of the abandonment of values by European communities in which they were rooted from their origins and which have animated their various national cultures and customs.

It should be noted here that the educational role of the state is a different issue than the role of the nation. Woroniecki clearly wrote about it. Both communities, as he pointed out, should have in mind the common good, that is to create for each of its members a possibility of a good and virtuous life. The difference, however, is that while the state cares for the common good through the law, the nation has an influence on shaping the character of the community members. Without this, the influence the common good can never be accomplished at all (Woroniecki 2004, 22-23). Thus, the function of the nation is more basic, but statehood is a great good for every nation (Woroniecki 2004, 43, 49). Consequently, creating a multinational community takes time and prudence. Attention should be focused on man and his moral development. Too violent integration processes can cause axiological

confusion among members of the community. According to Woroniecki, if the laws are too uniform, the customs of different nations would suffer; if, however, the uniformity of laws gives way to the diversity of customs, the internal unity of the state will collapse (Woroniecki 2004, 54). Let us add that integration, which is based on moral relativism hidden under the formula of tolerance, is apparent.

Finally, let us present one more Bocheński's interesting remark which concerns the issue of homeland. Namely, a given homeland is a contingent being and therefore limited in time (Bocheński 1989, 14). At some historical moment, it may be replaced by another form of social life. One may wonder whether globalization processes are the opportunity to launch such changes. Evaluation must come from ethics: does it respect human dignity? The transnational structures that are emerging in the world after World War II are not necessarily a threat to homelands and nations. This is confirmed by the experience of Europe in conducting integration processes and was underlined by John Paul II saying that the nations of Europe (as opposed to e.g. the African peoples) have a strong sense of self-identity (John Paul II 2005, 74).

2.3. Piety (*pietas*)

Analysing patriotism in a moral perspective also gives the possibility to recognize patriotic acts. As I noted in my, already mentioned, article: "The fact that owing to one's abilities and knowledge one does a service to one's homeland does not make one a patriot. Using the language of classical philosophy, it may be said that such people create high-quality works. Patriotism, however, is included in the concept of morality, the subject of which is not the quality of the work produced: it is oriented towards the good of man understood as a person." (Bouzyk 2017, 206). This claim is justified in classical philosophy which distinguishes moral actions from creative work (Krapiec 1983; Krapiec 1993). In the light of this distinction, as I stated: "an immoral person may be a great author, but never a patriot. This should be borne in mind, for in the modern canon of values the main stress is placed on knowledge, education, practical skills, creativity. All those, albeit valuable in themselves, have to be integrated with the moral life of man so in each concrete cognitive and creative situation the moral context has to be identified" (Bouzyk 2017, 206).

The love of homeland requires learning about native culture and living according to values fundamental to it as well. As MacIntyre states: "A national community, for example, which systematically disowned its own true history or substituted a largely fictitious history for it or a national community in which the bonds deriving from history were in no way the real bonds of the community (having been replaced for example by the bonds of reciprocal self-interest) would be one towards which patriotism would be – from any point of view – an irrational attitude" (MacIntyre 1984, 16).

The result of the effort to cultivate national values is to create a specific national character. Customs provide important support to this process. According

to Woroniecki, acceptance of customs (tradition), unless they violate the good of man as man, is important for moral development, because they give a practical interpretation of moral principles. Forcing and encouraging the abandonment of tradition exposes the average person to axiological confusion (Woroniecki 2004, 56-57). As nations differ in their customs, Woroniecki advised prudence in interfering in national customs during the integration processes. However, he warns against slavish adherence to customs. In moral life, man should consider the changes that take place in culture and society. Thus, rigid attachment to customs can be malignant to his moral life (Woroniecki 1986, vol. 1, 244).

I will also add that no service rendered to homeland can be understood as a form of slavery and be a result of manipulation to perform an activity, yet it should be remembered that it is still a duty. This duty is the outcome of the actual relation determining the existence of man, expressed in metaphysics as contingency. Namely, man owes his life to God, parents, and the community in which he has been raised. Reflecting this truth, classical ethics connects the virtue of justice with the related ones: faith and piety (Thomas Aquinas 1981, Sth, 2-2, 101, 1). The former makes one able to worship God, the latter – to revere parents, a family and homeland. Thomas Aquinas noted that piety refers to homeland as one of the foundations of human existence and the good of all countrymen. Thus piety is a tribute paid to the community in which one was raised and to which one owes his physical and spiritual shape: without the customs created by a larger community, family itself would not be able to produce advanced physical, mental and moral development of man; it would merely help to survive and satisfy the most primitive physical needs (Woroniecki 1986, vol. II-2, 125; see also MacIntyre 1984, 10).

Piety is expressed in the work for the existence and good of the homeland, e.g. in political, economic or military activity. Since one is part of one's homeland, one cannot treat it as a contractor (Bocheński 1989, 11). The specific feature of patriotism as a part of *iustitia legalis* is the disproportion between our possibilities and the reverence which we should manifest (Woroniecki 1986, vol. II-2, 76). In the case of patriotism it is the reverence for homeland. Hence, there is no single measure for patriotism. The most important are the individual efforts and care taken by everyone according to their abilities. Since piety should be altruistic, they should be based on one's internal freedom developed through the effort of shaping one's own character (Boużyk 2017, 204).

Christianity gives us one more interesting clue to the issue of patriotism. It is about homeland as a tool and a reflection of God's glory in the world. A man should praise God in all that is good and beautiful, including national cultures. Therefore, the love of the homeland is not only moral righteousness, but essentially – the love of God. Therefore, treason is not only dishonesty and meanness, but also a sin. Patriotism belongs to the fourth commandment of the Decalogue (John Paul II 2005, 71). The Pope points out that thanks to Christ the concept of homeland was opened towards eschatology and eternity. The eschatological perspective shows

that human life makes sense and that there is a sense of the history of nations, even of the painful and shameful one (John Paul II 2005, 80). The Pope perceives evil not only as an ontological lack of good, but as something finally overcome by good, due to redemption. He claimed that man working with the Creator is involved in building a civilization of love and that patriotism also works for it. The possessed virtues, including patriotism, make this process more effective and in this way have an impact on social morality and thus become an important factor shaping social relations.

It should be remembered that although by serving a homeland one serves God, the love of homeland cannot be combined with hatred for other cultures and nations and it cannot violate universal justice to which every man has the right. The multiplicity of nations and cultures are the sign of God Almighty. Each homeland usually is a part of a larger cultural community, e.g. Polish culture came into existence as a part of Christian culture and without this relation it loses its *raison d'être* (Bocheński 1989, 12). Despite this dependence, the impact of native culture on man is stronger than the impact of broader communities. Hence the primacy of love of homeland over other objects of love. One should not only confess to one's homeland but also lives according to the values one's national culture. Today managing integration processes requires to take into account this dependence.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the virtue of patriotism is a character trait and expresses the moral perfection of man. Like every virtue it requires development, for which both man and community are responsible. Let us remember that Pope John Paul II entrusted shaping patriotic attitudes to, i.e., the academic milieu. Education to patriotism, as understood by classical philosophy, should form a person in three aspects: psychical love (patriotic feelings), service (reverence for the community in which one has been raised and whose customs one has adopted as a basis for one's spiritual life) and common justice (making one prefer the good of the homeland over one's own). Patriotism understood as a virtue assumes the claims of human contingency, potentiality, and uniqueness of every man: patriotism is personified in man's individual attitudes towards his homeland. Like any other virtue, patriotism is based on freedom specific for man understood as a rational being. At the same time, it serves to protect this freedom, especially in its internal dimension. All the virtues have social significance and an impact on the culture of social life (classical ethics does not distinguish between social and individual virtues). Thus patriotism cannot be separated from someone's moral integrity. It should be also said that according to the theory of patriotic education, aimed at abandoning selfish attitudes for the benefit of the selfless love of the homeland, it is important to understand the ontic relation connecting man with his homeland and its objective value in his life.

Finally, I would like to return to the issues raised in Part 1 of the article and show, in the light of what has been established above, the direction in which one should look for the formula of modern patriotism.

Firstly, having recognised the moral dimension of patriotism, we face the need to evaluate globalization from the perspective of human development, which involves taking into account a cultural factor besides the economic and civilizational ones (Martin and Schumann 1999, 8; Krąpiec, 2004). The need of globalisation with a human face, i.e., based on the good of the individual, was repeatedly mentioned by John Paul II, e.g., when he presented the picture of “our generation” in the encyclical *Dives in misericordia* (10-12) or wrote about the value of work in the encyclical *Laborem exercens* (7-10). There are also some contemporary researchers who, using the so-called theory of sustainable development, demand that the globalisation processes should be humanised. For that reason the formula of cultural patriotism, i.e., one clearly relating to moral values, need not be necessarily treated as outdated, as it may foster the cohesion of a given society and consolidate its normative resources.

Secondly, when reflecting on modern patriotism it is worth remembering that national identity is an important part of the cultural formation of an individual. For that reason, Giddens’ postulate of cosmopolitanism should be considered as controversial, to say the least. Let us bear in mind how important it is which model of humanism is used in shaping the pro-social attitudes for it determines the understanding of human freedom and society. For that reason, when thinking about the way of forming prosocial attitudes we must first of all determine through philosophical reflection whether society is an ontic necessity in human life (Krąpiec 1993; Krąpiec 2004; Grzybowski 2016) and whether the forms of society such as a nation and state ensure an optimal personal development of an individual (Woroniecki 1986, vol. 1, 186-204).

Thirdly, when we consider which of the two formulas of patriotism is right, hence when we choose between national and transnational patriotism, it is necessary to look for the compatibility between the goals of the nation, state and objective personal goals. It may turn out that patriotism directed at national culture is not in contradiction to the tendencies for integration of nations and effectively works for the benefit of man as an individual.

Fourthly, since classical ethics perceives in patriotic attitudes an opportunity for transgressing the natural family or tribal bonds, and hence for “extending” in man the scope of love, the idea of local patriotism need not contradict, but may even provide an opportunity to foster patriotism which refers to national culture (homeland is mainly tantamount with the shared values).

Summing up, a philosophical reflection on the moral dimension of patriotism can provide the basis for dispelling doubts that patriotism currently inspires in connection with the political, social, and cultural changes happening today. My analysis has shown that it should be considered as an important universal value

and that the practical formula of its implementation, which is discussed in Part 1 the article, should not be predetermined. Modern patriotism may have a cultural and national character and not contradict the process of globalisation, of course if the latter implements the model of humanism aimed at an integral development of man.

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