Szostek, Andrzej2024-01-152024-01-151990Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1989-1990, T. 37-38, z. 2, s. 7-20.0035-7685http://theo-logos.pl/xmlui/handle/123456789/12406Tłumaczenie streszczenia Jan Kłos.The paper defends a thesis that objectivism is a condition of sensibleness of pursuing normative ethics. On the basis of biblical and literary examples the author analyzes the experience of getting to know one’s own fault. He points that an essential element of such an experience is perception of the value of a person who suffered injustice. This discovery, being different from other (so-called scientific) discoveries, retains the character of a discovery. That is to say, the character of the perception of values which hitherto have not been perceived by the subject clearly enough, neither have been created by that subject. Such a character of the discovery of values justifies ethical objectivism and explains its sense. An objectivistic standpoint in ethics brings about, among others, three implications: 1. an adequate to the experience of a value conception of man as its carrier (its axiologic superiority over non-rational beings); 2. epistemological realism (including an ability to get to know values), and 3. contingency of a human being. Finally, the author points at the “incongruity” between the anthropological and ethical considerations which tend to a more profound cognition of man himself, and modern technical mentality, with which mentality the modern shape of culture is too much imbued.plAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Polandhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/filozofiaphilosophymoralnośćetykamoralityethicsobiektywizmobjectivitynormatywnośćnormativityobiektywizm etycznyethical objectivityczłowiekhumangodnośćdignityrealizmrealismpoznaniecognitionrealizm teoriopoznawczyepistemological realismprzygodność bytu ludzkiegocontingency of a human beingArticle