Zagórski, Dariusz2023-10-122023-10-122004Roczniki Teologiczne, 2004, T. 51, z. 4, s. 5-42.1233-1457http://theo-logos.pl/xmlui/handle/123456789/11139Tłumaczenie streszczenia / Translated by Tadeusz Karłowicz.In book II of The Pedagogue Clement gives the following definition of μεσότης: “The mean state is good in everything, and especially in preparing a meal. Extremism is what causes or exposes one to a fall, whereas those states that are mean between extremities are good (profitable). The means is possession of what is necessary, as natural inclinations are determined by the necessity of what is indispensable.” Researchers generally agree that the above definition is based on the Aristotelian ideal of μεσότης formulated in The Nicomachean Ethics II 1107A in the following way: “So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it.” Pointing to the basic difficulties in defining what we call a mean state, Clement stressed three criteria that additionally define it: criterion of indispensability, criterion of harmony with nature and criterion of the just rational measure. On the basis of numerous examples taken from his own experience the author proves that extremisms are harmful and delusive.plAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Polandhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/teologiateologia patrystycznaKlemens AleksandryjskiArystotelespatrologiapatrystykaojcowie Kościołaμεσότηςdefinicjaproblemy definiowaniatheologypatristic theologyClement of AlexandriaAristotlepatristicspatrologyChurch Fathersdefinitionproblems of definingRecepcja Arystotelesowskiego ideału μεσότης w doktrynie Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego. Problem definicjiReception of the Aristotelian Ideal of μεσότης in Clement of Alexandria’s Doctrine. The Problem of DefinitionArticle