Wilk, Rafał Kazimierz2026-05-082026-05-082004Dissertationes Paulinorum, 2004, Tom 13, s. 82-101.1230-2910https://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/44091In the presented article the author depicts an issue concerning “pure I” in the Philosophical thoughts of Edith Stein. The “pure I” ‒ according to phenomenologists like: E. Husserl, E. Stein ‒ is such an “I” that belongs to each experience such as: “I think”, “I rejoice”, “I suffer” etc., and it is impossible to cross the “I” out from this kind of experience. The author tries to show, that this sort of assertion is a result of failing to take into brackets the influence of language. It is possible to find an experience that belongs to me although it does not outflow from “I”, but the structure of certain languages (e.g. German, English) does not allow putting into words experienced realities. Some languages, instead of helping to describe “what is experienced” adapt realities to their own abilities of description. Further the author shows, that Edith Stein in her Philosophical thought does not stop at the level of “pure I”, but she reaches the “personal I”.polCC-BY-SA - Uznanie autorstwa - Na tych samych warunkachżyciefilozofiamyślenie filozoficzneEdyta SteinTeresa Benedykta od Krzyżafenomenologiafilozofia Edyty Steinistnienieistnienie człowiekaludzkie Jaczyste „Ja”„Ja” osoboweduszażycie duszyciałobytbyt ludzkiintegracja bytu ludzkiegoczyste „Ja” w filozofii Edyty Steinlifephilosophyphilosophical thinkingEdith SteinTeresa Benedicta of the CrossphenomenologyEdith Stein’s philosophyexistencehuman existencehuman “I”pure “I”personal “I”soullife of the soulbodybeinghuman beingintegration of human beingpure “I” in the Edith Stein’s philosophyZagadnienie „czystego Ja” w filozofii Edyty SteinThe Issue of the “Pure I” in the Philosophy of Edith SteinArticle