Gałkowski, Jerzy W.2024-01-302024-01-302003Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2003, T. 51, z. 2, s. 127-137.0035-7685http://theo-logos.pl/xmlui/handle/123456789/12655The notion of fundamentalism refers mainly to religious attitudes, worldview, ideological and political tenets. It is an attitude that enforces certain social, or even individual, behaviours, and does not respect the subject-orientation in man. It is often referred to the ways of philosophising in which one tends to grasp the fundamental principles of the existence of the world and of man’s action. This manner of philosophising is set in opposition to any kind of free choice and relativism. It cannot be treated as „fundamentalism” if amongst the principles of action there is a principle of freedom, subject-orientation, that is, there is room for human conscience; or, when it is approved that human reason that discovers the principles of the world and action – as being contingent and limited – is not infallible. One should also bear in mind the difference between the practical attitude, including the social way of behaviour, and the theoretical attitude, one that is determined by the methodological and systemic principles of philosophy.plAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Polandhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/filozofiaphilosophyfundamentalizmfundamentalismpostawaattitudepostawa praktycznapostawa teoretycznazasadawolnośćprzemocpractical attitudetheoretical attitudeprinciplefreedomviolenceArticle