Straż, Stanisław2025-10-242025-10-241983Analecta Cracoviensia, 1983, T. 15, s. 25-39.0209-0864https://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/37979In analyses developed in the contemporary philosophy of science K. R. Popper is often presented as a representative of logical positivism or even of the Vienna Circle. In the paper the author defends an opposite view pointing out the essential differences between inductivist philosophy of R. Carnap and M. Schlick on one side and the metaphilosophical views of the creator of deductivism on the other. The attention is focused on the problem of criterion of demarcation, the role of falsification and the status of metaphysics. Popperian theory of three worlds, his analyses on human and methodological conditions of meaningfulness are indicated as examples of metaphysical issues which were considered meaningless by the Vienna Circle.plCC-BY-NC-ND - Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Bez utworów zależnychKarl Popperfilozofianaukagranice naukikoło wiedeńskiebiografiakrytyka naukimetafizykaphilosophysciencelimits of scienceVienna Circlebiographycritique of sciencemetaphysicsZagadnienie granic nauki w dyskusjach K. R. Poppera z kołem wiedeńskimThe Problem of Frontiers of Science in Discussions between K. Popper and the Vienna CircleArticle