Realizm w filozofii nauki

Abstract

Philosophers of science have failed to draw the full conclusions from the criticism of the neopositivist model of scientific enquiry. Realising that science does not fit this model they have agreed that, well, “that’s just too bad for science”. The constructivists, often guided by ideological considerations, have refused to grant it exclusive epistemological status (in comparison to myths, art or literature). The rest try to show its superiority while avoiding the classical conception of truth and replacing it with various surrogates. However, the criticism of that model makes it clear that science not only does not but could not fulfil the conditions set by that model because, being an expression of absolutist conceptions of certainty, it asks it to achieve the impossible. What is more, the conditions are arbitrary. This calls for the only justifiable conclusion - “too bad for the model” Coming to this conclusion is the beginning of a long and difficult process of re-evaluation, the construction of new conceptual schemes, new definitions and new criteria. This is the task the philosopher of science must face.