Przeglądaj wg Autor "Biesaga, Tadeusz"

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Alasdaira Maclntyre’a krytyka etyki nowożytnej i współczesnej
Biesaga, Tadeusz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1996)
The article reconstructs Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of modem and contemporary philosophy of morality. This critique, through its confrontation of various modem propositions of the theoiy of morality, reveals that the ethics of autonomous subjects whether in liberalism or in emotivism does not have as its foundations rational explanations of moral conduct, thus leaving us to our irrational impulses of will and emotion. A critical confrontation between modem and ancient ethics discloses why a modem project of moral theory failed. Having taken only fragments of teleological ethics of Aristotle or Aquinas, one could not reach rationality; that’s why, modernity created idiolects understood only within those fragments. When one does not have any rationality, one should draw from the rationality of Aristotle and Aquinas and develop it creatively. The rationality of such an ethics emphasises a necessity of the theory of virtue in philosophy and practice of morality. Omitting this essential element from modem and contemporary philosophy of morality makes ethics be formulated as a theory of egoism and, opposite to it, theory of conventional laws. In the social field this is realised as techniques manipulating others by a therapist and manager-expert of effectiveness.
Personalizm Karla Rahnera a personalizm Karola Wojtyły w sporze o teologię moralną
Biesaga, Tadeusz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 2000)
The article mentions the changes in the field of moral theology concerning the justification of the fundamentals of morality. It directs the discussion as a dispute between ethica of I. Kant and the ethica of St. Thomas, in particular as the dispute between two personalisms: personalism of K. Rahner and his disciples and the personalism of K. Wojtyla and his followers. The first is transcendental or idealistic personalism, the other is realistic personalism. The proposal of the fundamental option of person, namely: his/her project of oneself and social project, worked out in the new moral theology as the basis of morality, implies a dualistic, angelologie concept of man as freedom thrown into nature and in the field of ethics it reveals itself as hidden utilitarianism. The rejection of perceptive knowledge and receptive conscience in which the dignity of another person is revealed as a norm of morality leads to the destruction of personalism. Without revealing this dignity the other person as well as my own person will be unavoidably treated as a means of realizing my subjective selfproject as well as historical and social processes.