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    Problem prawdy w ujęciu Wilhelma z Owernii
    Pawlikowski, Tomasz (Wyższe Seminaria Duchowne Towarzystwa Salezjańskiego, 2012)
    William of Auvergne (1180-1249) was one of the first professors of the University of Paris to engage with the Greek, Islamic and Jewish philosophical writings that had become available in Latin translation. He was the author of a vast work that he called the Magisterium divinale (Teaching on God). De universo (On the Universe), written in the 1230s, is the most philosophical treatise of the Magisterium. One short part (I, 3, 25-26) of this treatise includes a very important philosophical topic ‒ the problem of truth. Based on the doctrine of Avicenna, William formulated one of the forms of truth’s classical definitions. In his view, this definition expresses the essence of logical truth, which constitutes the relation occurring between the intellect and the thing, if the intellect is adequate to the thing. So logical truth is a basis and property of tiue judgments and statements about all real things, and even about what really does not exist (things in the future, in the past, non-beings, negations), and ‒ generally ‒ about all that man can think about or everything that is possible to be thought about. William rejects the doctrine of St. Augustine, who taught that every truth has its source in the First Truth identified with God the Creator of all things and intellects. William argues that existing things are real and their existence is caused by God only, so only actually existing things can be substrates of truth and so subjects of true judgments and statements. The Creator doesn’t cause things as existing in the past or in the future, but as existing actually. What is more, He does not cause non-beings and negations. In consequence, William recognized logical tiuth as the only justification for tiue adjudication of all that exists and doesn’t exist. In Steven P. Marrone’s opinion, William’s theory of tiuth was a new idea in the early thirteenth century. He believes that William’s theory, however incomplete, explains how much the problem of truth is dependent on logic rather than metaphysics, so that it could be separated radically from questions of being and viewed independently of the issue concerning the relation of the mind and creatures to God. In fact, although William continued to speak in traditional tenns, he disagreed with the point of view of ontology and natural theology, finding solutions in theories of logic and language. However, studies reviewed for this article seem to show that William’s theory of tiuth is embedded in a metaphysical context. Furthermore, medieval logic is the science of the action of the intellect, which is a faculty of the human being. This is not logic in the twentieth-century’s sense. Thus, it does not seem to William resigned from metaphysics to logic. His theory of logical truth is imperfect because of metaphysical errors. The main error is that William considered logical truth, which is realized in the relation of intellect to things and so is one of the tiuths that exist in contingent beings, as final and the sole basis of every tiue judgment and statement, without regard to its dependence on the First Truth. Indeed, logical tiuth is not able to exist truly independently.
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    Zagadnienie aktu stwórczego w kwestii 44 części I „Sumy teologicznej” św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    Pawlikowski, Tomasz (Wyższe Seminaria Duchowne Towarzystwa Salezjańskiego, 2008)
    In Western theological and philosophical tradition, God is conceived to be the Creator of all that exists. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) has longstanding centrality in this understanding, by the time of Aquinas, concerns over the possibility of the universe itself existing from eternity led to thinking of creation out of nothing as the generic category of which initial creation. This doctrine involves, by St. Thomas Aquinas, areas of philosophical concern of Aristotle’s theory of four causes and Plato's theory of the participation, and the relationship between each. For Aquinas, the act of creation includes God’s activity as the efficient, exemplar and final cause every contigential things. The creation is the act whereby God brings a things into existence from a state of non-existence, but what is peculiar to creation is the entire absence of any prior subject ‒ matter ‒ ex nihilo subjecti. It is therefore likewise the production totius substantiæ ‒ of the entire substance. The preposition ex, “out of”, imply that nihil, “nothing”, is to be conceived as the material out of which a thing is made - materia ex qua. Moreover, the things or beings as an object of the creative act in its entitative dependence on the Creator, it follows that, as this dependence is essential, and hence inamissible, the creative act once placed is coextensive in duration with the creature’s existence and perfections. This is the participative dependence beings created on God. What makes possible coherence between theory of four causes and theory of the beings participation is Aquinas’ theory of analogy. This is general theory in Aquinas’ metaphysics. The analogy of beings allows to show as coexistences two difference aspects of the same created things: its dependence on God as Prima Causa and on God as being absolutely perfect (the created beings aren’t perfect, but they participate in its own act of existence and own perfections created by God). God as being absolutely perfect – fullness of perfection is the Self-subsistens Being itself – Ipsum Esse per se subsistens.