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Demokracja wobec wartości
Stachewicz, Krzysztof (Prymasowski Instytut Kultury Chrześcijańskiej im. Stefana Kard. Wyszyńskiego, 2008)
The title of my article touches on the problem of a relationship between the system of democracy and the sphere of values. Some of the questions that arise instantly are: What democracy do we refer to? What values are taken into consideration? How are they understood? Thus, an attempt has been made to define in two points the understanding of democracy and values as fundamental notional categories of the text. The third point deals with relationships between them and the epilogue poses some futurological predictions. Such an approach allows me to explain the complex matter of the theory of democracy as well as of the theory of values in general. Democracy as a formal creation requires complementary qualitative values and to some extent makes them its foundation. However, in contemporary democracy it is easy to notice certain mechanisms of value relativization. Those mechanisms are generated by tolerance and fear of fundamentalism. It seems, however, that nihilism will not be the future of democratic societies so we may look forward to the future with some optimism.
I Ogólnopolska Konferencja Naukowa „Co się dzieje z wartościami? Próby diagnozy”. Sprawozdanie
Stachewicz, Krzysztof (Prymasowski Instytut Kultury Chrześcijańskiej im. Stefana Kard. Wyszyńskiego, 2009)
Kilka uwag o milczeniu w moralności i etyce
Stachewicz, Krzysztof (Prymasowski Instytut Kultury Chrześcijańskiej im. Stefana Kard. Wyszyńskiego, 2007)
Moralność między rozumem a uczuciami. Kilka syntetyzujących uwag historycznych wywołanych dziedzictwem myśli Pascala i Kanta
Stachewicz, Krzysztof (Prymasowski Instytut Kultury Chrześcijańskiej im. Stefana Kard. Wyszyńskiego, 2009)
With his ordre du coeur, Pascal provokes questions concerning ethical emotionalism, regardless of a discussion whether he himself forms part of this paradigm of thinking. Similarly, with his concept of practical reason, Kant points to the tradition of ethical rationalism. Both philosophers provoke questions on the place and role of emotions and reason in morality. An analysis of this problem cannot disregard its historical perspective, as both ethical rationalism and emotionalism have a long and complex history. The complexity stems first and foremost from different, often contradictory, interpretations of the categories of reason and emotions. The article makes no pretension to completeness and accuracy in terms of an orderly presentation of the historical spectrum of attitudes. It aims to outline some traces representative of the whole history of disputes between ethical rationalism and emotionalism and to suggest a direction for further analysis of the problem.