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Pozycja Człowiek wobec wartościSzostek, Andrzej (Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1994)Pozycja Filozoficzne implikacje obiektywizmu w etyceSzostek, Andrzej (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)The paper defends a thesis that objectivism is a condition of sensibleness of pursuing normative ethics. On the basis of biblical and literary examples the author analyzes the experience of getting to know one’s own fault. He points that an essential element of such an experience is perception of the value of a person who suffered injustice. This discovery, being different from other (so-called scientific) discoveries, retains the character of a discovery. That is to say, the character of the perception of values which hitherto have not been perceived by the subject clearly enough, neither have been created by that subject. Such a character of the discovery of values justifies ethical objectivism and explains its sense. An objectivistic standpoint in ethics brings about, among others, three implications: 1. an adequate to the experience of a value conception of man as its carrier (its axiologic superiority over non-rational beings); 2. epistemological realism (including an ability to get to know values), and 3. contingency of a human being. Finally, the author points at the “incongruity” between the anthropological and ethical considerations which tend to a more profound cognition of man himself, and modern technical mentality, with which mentality the modern shape of culture is too much imbued.Pozycja Niektóre aspekty etyczne polskiej transformacjiSzostek, Andrzej (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1994)The author is rather putting forward questions and suggestions than formulating ready-made theses. He thinks that for the extraordinary moral metamorphosis in Poland in the 1980s it was easier to withstand the political pressure of that period than to build a morally healthier (better) society after 1989. The author first explains the significance of the transformation, started by the first pilgrimage of John Paul II to his home country and connected with the Solidarity trade union, which was characterized by the process of eradicating duplicity from social life in order to live in truth. The respect for the truth conforms human identity, dignity and freedom. At that time many fought in concord for the life in truth without resorting to violence. Nobody was surprised that the Solidarity congress, with no objections, declared for the legal protection of the unborn babies since the need to express solidarity with the weakest was obvious. The break up of the Solidarity ethos resulted in dishonesty in social life as well as in passivity, brutalization of interpersonal relationships, pursuit of private ends and dissension. The moral chaos emerged, where the principle of plus ratio quam vis was neglected.Pozycja Normatywna moc prawdySzostek, Andrzej (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The basic thesis in the article says that the truth has a normative authority. In his considerations the author first of all tries to follow St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought. St. Thomas stressed more strongly than other thinkers the various meanings of the binding power of the truth. although the idea of „the ethics of being faithful to the truth” (mainly discussed in §3) is contained in contained rather in St. Thomas’ system implicitly and not expressed explicitly. Taking into consideration Cardinal K. Wojtyła’s work is very helpful in making it explicit. The author shows the sense of the basic theses on three planes. First (§1) he analyses St. Thomas’ definition of truthfulness and discusses its rank and range, as opposed to various kinds of lies, and especially he looks for motives that made both St. Augustine and St. Thomas evaluate every kind of lie very negatively. Next (§2) he analyses a deeper meaning of „the truth as a virtue”, that is closer to the modern postulate of an authentic life. This, however, in St. Thomas’ work, finds its ultimate foundation in God, which reveals a deeper sense of righteousness as an expression of being faithful to the truth. The last part of the considerations (§3) is devoted to an explanation of the question: in what sense and why does any cognitive act by which one learns the truth carry a moral charge with it – a charge so strong that departure from the truth, even most banal, inevitably harms the subject itself that is a rational being.Pozycja Teleologizm a antropologiaSzostek, Andrzej (Wydawnictwo Pallottinum, 1982)Artykuł nawiązuje do ożywionej dyskusji na temat uzasadniania norm moralnych, jaka w ostatnich latach toczy się w gronie teologów katolickich. Autor zwraca uwagę na to, iż zwolennicy teleologizmu w tym sporze bronią zarazem pewnego rodzaju relatywizmu w kwestii rozumienia natury ludzkiej, choć związek tych dwu stanowisk: metaetycznego i antropologicznego nie jest logicznie konieczny. Przeciwnie nawet, uznanie teleologicznego typu uzasadniania norm za jedynie poprawny sugeruje raczej stałą hierarchię wartości (którą teologowie zakorzeniają zwykle w naturze ludzkiej) oraz możliwość poprawnego jej odczytania. W niedopracowaniu antropologicznych założeń teleologizmu widzi autor jedną z przyczyn, dla których teologowie broniący werbalnie teleologizmu, prezentują zarazem taką teorię natury ludzkiej i sumienia, której metaetyczną konsekwencją jest jedna z odmian deontologizmu. Konkluzję artykułu stanowi teza, iż najlepszą drogą do przezwyciężenia odczuwanego dziś przez teologów impasu w omawianej dyskusji jest dokładniejsze zajęcie się „antropologią normatywną”, stanowiącą podstawę norm moralnych i rozstrzygającą o trafności spornych stanowisk metaetycznych.