Analecta Cracoviensia, 1989-1990, T. 21-22

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Przeglądaj Analecta Cracoviensia, 1989-1990, T. 21-22 wg Temat "Alfred North Whitehead"

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    Problem substancji w whiteheadowskiej filozofii procesu
    Życiński, Józef (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1990)
    In debates concerning the relationship between basic principles of Whiteheadian process philosophy and the classical doctrine of substance, one can distinguish at least three types of essentially different approaches to the issue. Their substantial content may be summarized in the following way: 1. Process metaphysics implies definitive rejection of substantialist categories of traditional philosophy and introduces a radically new perspective in which notions of flux and change replace the former categories of enduring substances and relative immutability of individual sujects. 2. Whitehead’s approach to the traditional doctrine of substance results in a strong critique of it but not in total rejection. Certain elements of the Aristotelian and Cartesian legacy must be critically revised, but they cannot be eliminated from rational interpretation of nature. Their implicit presence in Whiteheadian interpretative schemes substantiates the opinion that process metaphysics introduces a reformed version of the doctrine of substance. 3. In spite of explicit critique of the concept of substance found in Whitehead’s texts, the same texts implicitly presuppose the necessity of reference to certain substantialist categories. Whitehead himself did not always formally recognize such a necessity; his metaphysical assertions, however, provide an objective basis for developing a modified theory of substance. Supporters of these essentially different viewpoints try to vindicate their approach by providing references to various works of Whitehead. It seems, however, impossible to defend thesis 1. unless general statements of „substantialist categories” are replaced by a more detailed formula concerning Aristotle’s theory of primary substance. Whitehead did not deny substance in general but only the static substance of a material substratum; this denial resulted not from his critique of Aristotle but rather from a conviction that the notion of static stuff so important for philosophical materialism must be replaced by the notion of fluent and structured energy (PR 362). Theses 2. and 3. may turn out to be mutually consistent if different texts of Whitehead are taken into consideration to justify them. The basic issue discussed in this paper deals not with hermeneutic questions concerning consistent interpretation of various Whiteheadian texts but with the substantive content of process metaphysics approached in the context of new scientific evidence. In such an approach, Whitehead’s particular pronouncements on substance are not regarded as final conclusions but only as constitutive elements of an intellectually appealing philosophical vision that needs further detailed elaborations. The exact reconstruction of Whitehead’s attitude to the traditional doctrine of substance remains difficult because of substantial evolution in his views as well as due to that fact that in choosing linguistic forms he was a far from careful writer. In spite of persisting interpretative dilemmas, an analysis of basic principles of Whiteheadian metaphysics renders groundless many popular opinions in which process philosophy is supposed to discard categorically any form of substantialism. When introducing indispensable distinctions in this simplified image, it seems particularly important to notice that: 1. Considering Whitehead together with Heidegger as authors united in their suspicion or open condemnation of substance overlooks their different attitudes towards traditional metaphysics. While Heidegger in his critique of onto-theology called into question basic assumptions of metaphysics, Whitehead regarded metaphysical reflection as an important constitutive element of human civilisation. 2. Whitehead’s views on this topic should be connected with the empiricist critique of substance, because he explicitly acknowledges that metaphysical reflections upon substance and the Absolute were important for the growth of our civilization as they implied overcoming naive empiricism. 3. Definitive rejection of the Aristotelian concept of primary substance results form the fact that this notion, useful in interpreting biological phenomena known to Aristotle, remains useless anthorpomorphism in the domain of the microworld. This concept cannot be treated as universal and ultimate in metaphysics, but it still may be useful to interpret „some features of the physical world.” (PR, 363) This acknowledgment leaves open the question whether or not the concept can be still used in philosophical anthropology where the terminological basis provided by process metaphysics remains evidently inadequate. 4. Heraclitean elements contained in process philosophy do not imply denial of substance, because the flux of events, as interpreted by Whitehead, is not an accidental chaos but an ordered exemplification of relations constituted by eternal objects. Whiteheadian principles explaining this order, contain many thing in common with the Aristotelian theory of secondary substance, Descartes’ res verae and Spinoza’s causa sui. 5. Whitehead’s reluctance to use the term „substance” might have been inspired, at least in part, by an attempt to avoid terminological ambiguities connected with the term. The very fact that even debates on variants of Aristotle’s theory of substance still generate new controversies would definitively prompt one to introduce terminology independent of controversial issues of the past. Terminological preferences expressed in replacing Cartesian „substance” by „actual entity” remain relatively unimportant when the role of formal structure and unactualized potential is taken into consideration in the new interpretative patterns. 6. New physical theories in which the physical substratum plays no role confirm the Whiteheadian thesis that matter disappeared from the scientific image of nature and that essential physical structures can be described in the terms of mathematical relations. This epistemological revolution originated by Einstein and Planck still goes on in physics providing theories that seem hardly consistent with the philosophy of materialism and empiricism. Metaphysical ramifications of these theories can be easily interpreted in terms of process metaphysics. 7. It is hard to demonstrate conclusively that Whitehead accepted the necessity of a reformed doctrine of substance. It is much easier to discover that central principles of his philosophy remain close to metaphysical tenets underlying the doctrine of substance. Critical reflection upon both the principles and the doctrine may turn out to be heuristically valuable and can really reverse the slow descent of accepted thought towards the inactive commonplace.