Human Good, Virtues and Practice: Macintyre’s Account of a Thomistic-Aristotelian Practical Rationality

Abstract

The article is an attempt to articulate MacIntyre’s characterization of the Thomistic-Aristotelian moral theory, which he defends as being a superior account of moral philosophy. MacIntyre argues that we could not possibly come up with a neutral moral standard to guide our actions, that is, that our practical decisions and actions are largely influenced by our adherence to a particular tradition, and that our moral choices are always a product of our upbringing that has oriented us towards a particular understanding of the good. He then takes upon himself the task of articulating the core of a Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition, particularly its understanding of the human good, with the hope of showing the superiority of its narrative over its rivals. Moreover, this article argues that given MacIntyre’s emphasis on Thomistic-Aristotelian theory, moral philosophy could not and should not ignore the contribution of moral formation as an important component of moral philosophy, which should be concerned not only with the search for the legitimate foundations of moral theories, but also with an account of how ordinary people actually make their moral choices.