Problem z XIX-wiecznym modelem etyki pracy

Abstract

In order to obtain something which makes a person happy, he or she must perfonn an action which is ‒ in the opinion of others ‒ valuable and worthy of compensation. From the previous sentence, we can deduce a simple truth: that nothing is for free, rather, each thing has its price. Or, in other words, sometimes you have to be a giver in order to be given something later. Work is a noble act, although many people may become indignant about this statement. By working, we multiply things we already have or we get new things. Activity which makes us richer is attributable to human nature, and inactivity or a satisfaction with things we already have is in contradiction to this nature. Taking into account work ethic, we can consider as moral only such an activity by an individual which has won recognition in somebody else’s eyes, the highest manifestation of which is remuneration. Nowhere else except on the grounds of work ethic do we encounter a dissatisfaction of some people with the actions of others, e.g. with the behavior of an employer who evades the obligation to pay for work completed. Since becoming a part of social discussion, work ethic has served politicians, as well as philosophers and clerics, in fighting reluctance to this organization of everyday life, which is governed by the clock and operating hours of a factory. This aversion was based on an aspiration to satisfy one’s own needs, and nothing more. A 19th-century laborer, having been given a remuneration which enabled him or her to live a poor existence ‒ poor but existence, did not see a reason why he or she should work more. After all, outside of work there were so many interesting things to do, that it was not worth it to waste time money-grubbing.