Dyskusja nad pracą J. M. Broekmana „Phänomenologie und Egologie, faktisches und transzendentales Ego bei Edmund Husserl”, M. Nijhoff, den Haag 1963, s. 224 + X.

Abstract

The article discusses Broekman’s solution of the problem: how is the transcendental ego related to the factual ego in the philosophy of E. Husserl. The author of the article proves that Brockman is not reliable enough in presenting Husserl’s views on intentionality, on reduction, on the splitting of ego, on the structures of the pure ego and of the transcendental ego, as well as on the temporal character of ego, that he omits a number of essential questions and does not eliminate the ambiguities of the views of Husserl and those of his own ones. The final solution of the essential problem is also unsatisfactory. The idea of attitude, involved in it, is unclear, we do not know to what extent is an ego free in passing from one attitude to another and why various egos are required for various attitudes. All those difficulties arise in consequence of the fact that Brocliman neglects the problem of constitution, especially that of the constitution of the person.