Pytanie o zasadniczy cel Kantowskiej „Krytyki czystego rozumu”

Abstract

What was the most important objective of this penetrating analysis of the way hum an mind functions which I. Kant carried out in his Critique of Pure Reason? It seems that the statements of Kant himself, if we treat them with due attention, give a clear (definite) answer to this inquiry. They indicate very clearly that the most important objective for Kant was the matter of „grounding” metaphysics as a science. This grounding was firstly to explain the cause (reason) of continuous cognitive failures of traditional metaphysics. Secondly — or rather primarily — it was to show those fundamental principles that would be the base to build upon truly academic m etaphysics. Altough Kant's words on this subject seem to be clear enough, various later interpretations of the most important objective of Critique of Pure Reason would differ from Kant's own opinions. Two of these interpretations are probably commonly known. The first one was the work of the so-called neo-Kantians, the second was proposed by M. Heidegger. Both interpretations, though in a different way, twisted the sense of Kant's reflections specifically. For they ignore some of his essential opinions placing at the same time too much emphasis and specific light on others. Yet, can this kind of alternation of Kant's thoughts be rightly regarded as „an interpretation” of his very thought? This article wants to show in what way the answer to the question about the most important objective of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason emerges from the author’s very texts.