Ja transcendentalne w filozofii Edmunda Husserla

Abstract

In the treatise entitled „The transcendental ego in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl” the structure of the so called transcendental ego, proposed by Husserl, is subjected to a critical analysis. The treatise consists of two parts. The first part presents briefly Husserl’s philosophical views, the second part is devoted to a critical appreciation of those views. The basic critical questions are as follows: ist the subject of consciousness identical with the ego of consciousness? Is the transcendental ego the pure ego? In my endeavours to answer the above questions I based myself on the differentiations introduced by R. Ingarden in his ontology (footnote 1). In the second chapter, § 2, I subjected to analysis the special way of isolating the transcendental ego from the sphere of the transcendental consciousness, as an independent object of investigation. The results of the investigation are as follows: 1. In order to investigate the ego as such a special method is re quired which would enable a separation of the ego from the sphere of consciousness. I call this method the „egotic reduction”. It consists in an intuitive passing from what is mine as mine, i. e., from the so called egotic possessive moment, through what is mine in a higher degree, to what is just myself. The passing in question is justified by the necessary relation between the egotic possessive moments and the ego, which has been detected. 2. Husserl was not right in identifying the transcendental ego with the pure subject of consciousness. Between the pure subject of consciousness and the transcendental ego there are some necessary relations, indeed, but the former is not the latter: the pure subject of consciousness is the subject form of consciousness (in the sense pro posed by Ingarden’s ontology), and the ego of consciousness, taken in its original individuality, is nothing from the sphere of form. Therefore the one cannot be identified with the other in an absolute way. 3. The transcendental ego is not the pure ego. First of all, it is qualified by some habitual qualities as well as by some other qualities, more primary ones, which enable the appearance of the habitual qualities. Besides, it is qualified in itself by some content which deter mines its individuality and conditions its isolation from the rest of the stream of consciousness. Consequently, by criticizing Husserl neither the existence of the subject of consciousness (as is the case with the positivists) nor the existence of the ego of consciousness (as is the case with the neo-Kantists) is called in question. A positive answer to the question „what is the transcendental ego?” is given in another treatise of the author (cf. the footnote 51).