Roczniki Filozoficzne

Stały URI zbioruhttps://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/12375

Roczniki Filozoficzne są jednym z najstarszych filozoficznych czasopism naukowych w Polsce, ukazują się nieprzerwanie od 1948 roku. Obecnie są kwartalnikiem publikowanym zarówno w wersji elektronicznej, jak również w tradycyjnej wersji papierowej. Celem czasopisma jest publikowanie najlepszych, oryginalnych artykułów z dziedziny filozofii, a także przekładów, recenzji, sprawozdań i polemik. Wydawane jest przez Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL oraz Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II w Lublinie.

W repozytorium „Theo-logos” udostępniony jest tylko zeszyt 2: Filozofia moralności, filozofia religii.

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    Bioetyka czy bioetyki? O możliwości konsensu w bioetyce
    Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2001)
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    Czy wolno „kłamać z konieczności”?
    Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
    Though a lie is usually considered as an evil, quite often a moral approbation achieve cases of the so-called “lie from the necessity”, when subject is convinced, that lie serves as an end to a goal. It is enough to mention the lie in defense of a secret or lie to defend one’s life. The question of the moral appraisal of acts, where the means have been chosen to achieve an end, was carefully analyzed by St. Thomas Aquinas, and his doctrine is a basis for this article. St. Thomas’s analysis of human acts proves that the mean (finis operis) chosen by the subject to achieve the goal (finis operantis) is neither morally indifferent, nor justified by the end itself. St. Thomas however permits actions, that bring about both good and bad effects but only when the means chosen for an end are within the proportional reason. It reason is proportional when there is no less harmful way of protecting the value here and now, therefore both means and the end must be proportional to the ultimate end. This condition never complies with the lie (cannot be referred to the lie), so St. Thomas allows here only a prudent concealing of truth, but unfortunately he doesn’t explain how he understands it. The prudent concealing of truth cannot negate the value of truth. It occurs when the good of the others demands the manifestation only part of the fact. The concealing of the truth can be immoral if some is called upon to be a witness. Especially difficult are those situations, where one is forced to unveil information to bad ends. Even the threat of death cannot justify the lie, though one must admit, that the guilt of the man who is lying in an especially difficult situation is different from the guilt of man who lies for some material benefit.
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    Etyka konsekwencjalna czy konsekwencjalizm w etyce?
    Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1996)
    The problem of the consequentialism in ethics is the subject of this paper. J. Nida-Rümelin, who is a professor of philosophy in Göttingen, criticizes in his book Critique of Consequentialism the following thesis: one acts in a rational way when one endeavors to achieve the best possible effects. In his opinion this thesis gives expression to the false consequentialist rationality which is often used in ethics. The author notices the following errors of the consequentialist rationality: it disturbs the persons’s integrity and one’s individual rights and excludes the possibility of the so-called coordination. This coordination expresses a possibility of the harmonization the individual action led (guided by) the consequentialist postulate on one hand and of the social action on the other hand (also led by consequentialist postulate). We may say however that some intuitions of the consequentialist thesis are right. In fact everyone who acts, acts towards a certain effect. It does not mean however that one is obliged to act because one’s action achieves the best possible effects. One ought to act when is faced by the value. It depends upon the value which means should be chosen to reach it. So one calculates the means and not the effects. Moreover, before the calculation of the effects one ought to find out the relationship between the agent and the effects. Not all the effects are intended directly by the agent.
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    Kenneth Kearon, Medical Ethics: An Introduction, Dublin 1995, The Columba Press, ss. 111.
    Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1996)
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    Moralne aspekty postępu nauk biomedycznych: dylematy stare czy nowe?
    Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)
    The essence of the dilemmas of the development of biomedical sciences lies in the problem of human freedom. The question is whether the genetic research, going ever deeper into the human genom, should be stopped or should be prolongated in the name of freedom of science. The scientific development creates not only threats but also new opportunities of curing diseases so far incurable. So we ought not to regard the scientific development as wrongful in itself. The good of the person however should be always its end and final criteria.
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