Roczniki Filozoficzne
Stały URI zbioruhttps://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/12375
Roczniki Filozoficzne są jednym z najstarszych filozoficznych czasopism naukowych w Polsce, ukazują się nieprzerwanie od 1948 roku. Obecnie są kwartalnikiem publikowanym zarówno w wersji elektronicznej, jak również w tradycyjnej wersji papierowej. Celem czasopisma jest publikowanie najlepszych, oryginalnych artykułów z dziedziny filozofii, a także przekładów, recenzji, sprawozdań i polemik. Wydawane jest przez Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL oraz Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II w Lublinie.
W repozytorium „Theo-logos” udostępniony jest tylko zeszyt 2: Filozofia moralności, filozofia religii.
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Pozycja Afirmacja Boga w ludzkiej moralnościKrąpiec, Mieczysław Albert (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1996)Pozycja „Ale nam się porobiło”Gałkowski, Jerzy W. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The paper is a brief commentary John Poul II’s address delivered in the Polish parliament, on 11th June 1999.Pozycja Alienacja zasadnicza: człowiek BogiemZdybicka, Zofia J. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998)Pozycja Andrzej Bronk, Nauka wobec religii (teoretyczne podstawy nauk o religii), Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1996, ss. 252.Mazanka, Paweł (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998)Pozycja Andrzej Szostek MIC, Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości, Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL 1995, ss. 412.Merecki, Jarosław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998)Pozycja Auto-informacja auto-imperatywem? Krótki komentarz (z licznymi wątpliwościami) do artykułu Tadeusza Stycznia „Etyka jako antropologia normatywna”Herbut, Józef (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998)Pozycja Bernharda Weltego rozumienie religii w świetle jego filozofiiMazanka, Paweł (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)Pozycja Bibliografia prac s. prof. dr hab. Zofii Józefy ZdybickiejPtaszek, Robert T. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Professor, Sister Zofia J. Zdybicka has been a head of the Philosophy of Religion Department at Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) since 1973. She undertook her studies on the Department of Christian Philosophy of KUL in 1956 and continued them until 1961. In 1965 she defended her doctoral thesis on „Philosophical grounds of cognizability of God according to Henri de Lubac”. She became Assistant Professor in 1970 with her habilitation thesis „The participation of being. A trial on understanding the relation belween God and the world”. She received tuition at Catholic University of Louvain (1972), Leuven (1981), and Yale University (New Haven – USA 1977/78). In the years of 1980-1984 she was a head of Theoretical Philosophy Section. She has been a Dean of the Department of Christian Philosophy of KUL since 1990 up to the present moment. She is a member of the Research Council of John Paul II Institute and a member of Episcopal Council for Culture. She has been Mother Superior of the Centre of Lublin Order of the Ursulan Sister of the Heart of the Dying Jesus. She is a representative of the Lublin Philosophical School, an author of the holistic interpretation of the religious fact in the sphere of classical philosophy of being, which makes philosophy of religion an independent branch of research in the system of realistic philosophy. Her interests are revolvinground the problems connected with God (participation theory, the problem of God cognition, etc.). Apart from historical and systematic considerations she has been also conducting methodological research on the status of different types of the philosophy of religion and its relation to other religiologic disciplines. She has supervised over 1000 master thesis and many doctoral thesis. She has been an author of more than 200 scicntific publications. Her major work on the philosophy of religion was published in English, too: „Person and religion: an in troduction to the philosophy of religion, trans. by Theresa Sandok, New York i in.: Peter Lang 1991.Pozycja Bioetyka czy bioetyki? O możliwości konsensu w bioetyceChyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2001)Pozycja Błąd naturalistyczny a prawo naturalne. Josefa Fuchsa krytyka tomistycznej koncepcji prawa naturalnegoMerecki, Jarosław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)In the paper the author analyzes the critique of the Thomistic theory of natural law put forward by a German theologian Josef Fuchs. The question Fuchs seeks to answer can be formulated as follows: In what sense nature can be called the basis of morality? Fuchs distinguishes three possible meanings of the term „nature”: 1) biological structure of man, 2) the specific essence of a given human act (e.g. a sexual act), 3) personal nature of man defined by his freedom and rationality. According to Fuchs, the Thomistic theory of natural law contains, at least in some of its modes of argumentation, an error called − after G. E. Moore − naturalistic fallacy. It consists in deducing normative conclusions from descriptive premises. Fuchs distinguishes three forms of this error. In the first form, biological laws are taken for moral norms. In the second, normative conclusions are inferred from the description of the specific essence of a given act. The third form of the same error can be called „theological fallacy”: it consists in not distinguishing between God s creative will and God s moral will. The present paper is focused on the distinction between different forms of the naturalistic fallacy objection. In his next paper the author will investigate to what extent this objection is valid as far as the structure of Thomistic ethics is concerned.Pozycja Chrześcijańskie widzenie cnotyHauerwas, Stanley; Pinches, Charles (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)We begin the article by criticizing views of the moral life which depend on the existence of a special sphere of moral obligation. As Christian theologians, we admit our preference for virtue thinking, for it considers not only what we do but who we are. Nonetheless, while virtue thinking is gaining popularity among Anglo-American philosophers, we have doubts about whether its proponents recognize that virtues make sense only when imbedded in particular historical communities. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre understands this, but as John Milbank’s criticisms reveal, his thought ultimately is more firmly rooted in Greek theories of virtue than in Christian beliefs, particularly those articulated by Aquinas regarding the centrality of charity, and its implications for Christian peacemaking.Pozycja Ciągłość i rozwój. Osiemdziesiąt lat filozofii na KUL-uJaneczek, Stanisław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The paper presents an outline of the history of the philosophical faculty at the KUL both in the perspective of the function of philosophy as a discipline which has a formative character, and is studied by students of all faculties in order to build the foundations of the Christian attitude and for their formal education, and – first of all – as a research centre. Attention is especially paid to the dynamics of developing the methods of philosophising. It started with Louvain Thomism dominating in the period between the two world wars, passed through the influences of traditional Thomism, to showing more fully the specificity of existential Thomism. It is characteristic of the Lublin philosophical school (formed by S. Swieżawski, J. Kalinowski, M. A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, K. Wojtyła; and in the next generation – Z. J. Zdybicka, A. B. Stępień. T. Styczeń). It recurs to the ideals of the classical way of practising philosophy, first of all formulating a realistic conception of reality. However, it does so, leading a discussion with the whole of the philosophical hcritage (especially critically using the achievements of phenomenology and analytical philosophy and treating the history of philosophy as sort of philosophical laboratory) and using the tools of modern methodology and logic. Moreover, it stresses the autonomy of philosophy and its independence of ideology and scientistically understood research. In the aspect of interest in particular branches of philosophy this meant a change Irom stressing the role of metaphysics to a broader development of anthropology and philosophy of the law, philosophy of God and religion, and finally – personalistic ethics. Next attention is drawn to the share of the Lublin circle in the international and Polish philosophical movement, especially with respect to organisation of congresses, conferences and symposia, membership of particular scholars in philosophical associations, and their participation in the editorial staffs of periodicals. Finally some philosophical publications, typical of the Lublin circle, especially in congress languages are mentioned.Pozycja Człowiek wobec religii. Filozoficzne aspekty religijnego sensu, red. Krzysztof Mech, Kraków: Zakład Wydawniczy „Nomos” 1999, ss. 264.Moskal, Piotr (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2001)Pozycja Czy możemy zrozumieć samych siebie?Winch, Peter (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1996)Pozycja Czy religia dopuszcza wojnę?Zdybicka, Zofia J. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992)War has been present in the history of humanity for many ages, that is the fact of settling disputes and accomplishing political aims by violence with thee use of military forces. It is something strange, and difficult to understand. The relation between religion and war is particularly interesting, since religion of its own nature is put to safeguard human life (“you shall not kill”). There is a mutual diffusion of opinions and evaluations between the religious and philosophical thought in considering the phenomenon of war. That is why the author has included the philosophical. Thought in order to make the religious standpoint more prominent against the philosophical background (Judaism, Islam, Christianity). Three philosophical standpoints concerning war are most prominent: − bellism i.e. approval of war as a natural state of affairs (Heraclitus, Empedocles, Hobbes, Hegel, Marx), − pacifism i.e. unconditional elimination of war (Kant, Tolstoy), − the conception of a “just war”. Christianity has drawn on to the latter (Plato, Aristotle, Augustin) in which war is not something natural and unconditionally necessary, yet in some situations it is inevitable as a defence against greater evil. Numerous Christian thinkers have worked out the theories of a “just war” or rather a “justified war” waged by competent authorities, due to serious reasons, having in view the saving of a good. The contemporary cultural and technical situation (sophisticated means to kill and their long-term consequences) as well as the deepening awareness of man's and humanity's rights, to peaceful coexistence have brought about a new relation to war which is being described as “war against war”. More and more often has one talked not about “a right to war” but about “a duty to peace”. Churches, including the Catholic Church, join in the activities of the international institutions which aim at settling conflicts in a peaceful manner and at safeguarding peaceful coexistence, first of all by means of guaranteeing human rights by particular regimes and social systems.Pozycja Czy wolno „kłamać z konieczności”?Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)Though a lie is usually considered as an evil, quite often a moral approbation achieve cases of the so-called “lie from the necessity”, when subject is convinced, that lie serves as an end to a goal. It is enough to mention the lie in defense of a secret or lie to defend one’s life. The question of the moral appraisal of acts, where the means have been chosen to achieve an end, was carefully analyzed by St. Thomas Aquinas, and his doctrine is a basis for this article. St. Thomas’s analysis of human acts proves that the mean (finis operis) chosen by the subject to achieve the goal (finis operantis) is neither morally indifferent, nor justified by the end itself. St. Thomas however permits actions, that bring about both good and bad effects but only when the means chosen for an end are within the proportional reason. It reason is proportional when there is no less harmful way of protecting the value here and now, therefore both means and the end must be proportional to the ultimate end. This condition never complies with the lie (cannot be referred to the lie), so St. Thomas allows here only a prudent concealing of truth, but unfortunately he doesn’t explain how he understands it. The prudent concealing of truth cannot negate the value of truth. It occurs when the good of the others demands the manifestation only part of the fact. The concealing of the truth can be immoral if some is called upon to be a witness. Especially difficult are those situations, where one is forced to unveil information to bad ends. Even the threat of death cannot justify the lie, though one must admit, that the guilt of the man who is lying in an especially difficult situation is different from the guilt of man who lies for some material benefit.Pozycja David B. Resnik, The Ethics of Science: An Introduction, London−New York: Routledge 1998, ss. 221.Lasik, Magdalena (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2001)Pozycja Dennis J. Billy, Terence Kennedy (eds.), Some Philosophical Issues in Moral Matters. The Collected Ethical Writings of Joseph Owens, Roma: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae 1996, ss. 500, indeks osobowy.Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998)Pozycja Dictionnaire des religions. Réd. P. Poupard. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1984 ss. 1830.Zdybicka, Zofia J. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)Pozycja „Diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus” a idea szkoły lubelsko-liechtensteińskiejSeifert, Josef (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1996)