Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne, 1995-1996, T. 14
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Przeglądaj Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne, 1995-1996, T. 14 wg Autor "Kloch, Józef"
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Pozycja Ograniczenia sztucznej inteligencji w ujęciu Huberta L. Dreyfusa (cz. 2)Kloch, Józef (Instytut Teologiczny w Tarnowie, 1996)In this second part of my paper Limitations of artificial intelligence by Hubert L. Dreyfus is going about language translation and pattern recognition. In language translation, even the elements to be manipulated are not clear due to the intrinsic ambiguities of a natural language. Dreyfus set ambiguity tolerance against context-free precision. Word-by-word translation {mechanical dictionary) is possible for any computer but translating a natural language (understanding in context of use) is impossible. The order of the words in a sentence does not provide enough information to enable a machine to determine which of several possible parsings is the appropriate one. Also Bar-Hillel and Oettinger, two of the most respected workers in the field of automatic language translation, agree in their pessimistic conclusions concerning the possibility of further progress in the field. In pattern recognition, difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception (perspicuous grouping vs. character lists). These difficulties have brought to a standstill the first five years of work on Cognitive Simulation. A computer must recognize all patterns in terms of a list specific traits. This raises of exponential growth which human beings are able to avoid by proceeding in a different way. Any system which can equal human performance, must be able to distinguish the essential features of a particular instance of a pattern and take account of the context. Work in pattern recognition has had a late start and an early stagnation. Indeterminate needs and goals and the experience of gratification which guides their determination cannot be simulated on a digital machine whose only mode of existence is a series of determinate states. It is just because these needs are never completely determined for the individual and for mankind as a whole that they are capable of being made more determinate, and human nature can be retroactively changed by individual and cultural revolutions.