Analecta Cracoviensia

Stały URI zbioruhttps://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/7222

Analecta Cracoviensia to interdyscyplinarny, recenzowany rocznik Uniwersytetu Papieskiego Jana Pawła II w Krakowie, który ukazuje się nieprzerwanie od 1969 roku. Czasopismo zostało stworzone przez środowisko naukowe skupione wokół ówczesnego Wydziału Teologicznego w Krakowie. Czasopismo prezentuje interdyscyplinarne perspektywy współczesnej humanistyki z punktu widzenia katolickiego. Zakres tematyczny artykułów obejmuje obszary związane z naukami teologicznymi: filozofia (wraz z kosmologią relatywistyczną i studiami wokół relacji nauka-wiara), historia (szczególnie historia Kościoła) i prawo kanoniczne. Od niedawna publikowane są studia z zakresu nauk społecznych (szczególnie pedagogiki).

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Autonomia podmiotu politycznego w ujęciu Johna Rawlsa
Andryszczak, Piotr (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 2008)
Rawls’s philosophy in general and his conception of the person in particular has undeniably Kantian foundations. Kant, in his attempt to find a basis for his ethic, came to a conclusion that it can be found only in the autonomy of the will which has to be independent of any empirical determination. Any influence of our social and psychological inclinations leads us to the refusal of freedom and makes our will heteronomous. Therefore we are able to be moral only as participants in a transcendental subject. Rawls preserves Kant’s teaching by detaching it from transcendental idealism and recasting in the new context. His social and political theory is founded on a specific anthropology. The metaphysical essence of a person is not determined by any form of the good, ie by the ends we choose, but consists in our capacity to choose them. The reason for that is very clear: If a conception of the good were a part of my identity, I would try to impose it on others in a society we plan to build behind the veil of ignorance. That is why only the persons who are individuated prior to their ends can construct a just society. So in Rawls’s view the autonomy turns out to be our essence. However his anthropology and his political thought as well induce us to raise some objections to his proposals. Rawls sees a human being in a very abstract and artificial way and such characteristic does not show the truth about ourselves but is used by him to justify liberal principles. Rawls simply constructs a certain notion of the person, which is liberal in its content to convince us that we have to choose to live in a liberal society. If we do not recognise ourselves in his theory of the person and therefore we are reluctant to accept the liberal vision of society, then what?
Krytyka liberalizmu w filozofii Alasdaira Maclntyre’a
Andryszczak, Piotr (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 2005)
MacIntyre’s relation to Liberalism is to be viewed in the broader context of his understanding of history of philosophy and in particular of history of ethics. In his opinion the Enlightenment project of justifying morality had to fail because its thinkers rejected Aristotle’s teleological scheme based upon three elements: man-as-he-happens-to-be, the precepts of rational ethics and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Since the Enlightenment abandoned the last element of the scheme, its project could not stand. Contemporary moral debates confirm the fundamental weakness of the Enlightenment reason which is unable to resolve any moral disagreement. Emotivism tries to explain that situation saying that our moral judgments cannot be true or false for they are only expressions of attitude and feeling. In any moral debate we cannot use objective and impersonal standards because they do not exist. What we can do instead is attempt to manipulate others in order to produce in them the same feelings and attitudes. In today’s liberalism we discover the work of the Enlightenment reason and echo of its consequence which is emotivism. Liberalism asserts that we are unable to reach the truth about the good of human life. Instead of discussing that problem interminably we should put it aside and only establish frames within which everybody can live his or her concept of the good life. Such solution is nevertheless misleading because it conceals the essential thing that liberalism under the cloak of neutral procedures promotes its own concept of the good life based on autonomy. It is hard to find any contemporary moral debate in which liberalism is not involved by giving specific and highly controversial solutions, f. e. education or abortion. It would like to play a part of arbiter but in fact it represents the side in the dispute.
La libertà puramente negativa. La versione limitata della libertà
Andryszczak, Piotr (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 2001)
We współczesnym liberalizmie wolność negatywna przybiera kształt postulatu neutralności stawianego państwu. Oznacza to, iż nie może ono popierać żadnej koncepcji dobra, albowiem, zdaniem zwolenników tego stanowiska, nie można ustalić żadnej obiektywnej hierarchii wartości. Wobec tego dobro jest czymś na wskroś prywatnym, pozbawionym jakiegokolwiek znaczenia w sferze publicznej. W niej bowiem sprawiedliwy porządek budujemy jedynie wówczas, gdy nie pozwalamy żadnej wizji dobra zająć uprzywilejowanego miejsca. Takie stanowisko wymaga wszechstronnej krytyki, wskazującej słabe punkty czysto negatywnego rozumienia wolności. Bezspornie każdy potrzebuje sfery wolnej od ingerencji innych jako niezbędnej dla własnej samorealizacji, tym niemniej owa samorealizacja potrzebuje także „ram pojęciowych” (Taylor), wyznaczających pewien uprzedni wobec naszych decyzji porządek moralny. Tak więc jest ona możliwa tylko wtedy, gdy potrafimy przezwyciężyć proponowany relatywizm i poświęcić się wartościom autentycznym. W takiej sytuacji, aczkolwiek to do nas należy, aby nadać sens i znaczenie własnemu życiu, to jednak nie dokonujemy tego w metafizycznej i moralnej pustce, ale w świecie, którego porządek jest przez nas odkrywany, a nie stwarzany. Rozwiązanie przeciwne sprawia, iż w rzeczywistości pozbawionej hierarchii wartości każda koncepcja dobra zasługuje na jednakowe uznanie, każde dobro, jako stwarzane przeze mnie, zasługuje na ten sam szacunek, a zatem zaciera się granice zarówno między dobrem a złem, jak i pomiędzy tym, co życiowo doniosłe a tym, co banalne. Czy liberalizm relatywistyczny nie jest zrelatywizowanym liberalizmem, ktorego wybór jest tak samo dobry jak każdego innego poglądu?
Liberalizm polityczny – niespełniona obietnica
Andryszczak, Piotr (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Papieskiego Jana Pawła II w Krakowie, 2009)
Having become aware that his conception, as put forth in “A Theory of Justice”, could be accepted only by Liberals, J. Rawls concluded that a well-ordered society built on it would not be stable. Therefore, given the fact of reasonable pluralism of incompatible comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines, he no longer presents his “justice as fairness” as comprehensive, but as political. According to him, a political conception of justice has three features: it is concerned with the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime; it does not presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine; and, it is formulated in terms of two fundamental ideas implicit in the public culture of a democratic society (the ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation, and of persons viewed as free and equal). Due to this change, the justification of justice as fairness proceeds from what is held in common and leads to an agreement based on the overlapping consensus of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Political reinterpretation of liberalism seems very attractive, but a critical examination of it immediately unveils its weakness. The demand of bracketing comprehensive moral and religious questions for political purposes produces in citizens a kind of schizophrenia because they must not resolve issues (i.e., the question of abortion) invoking their own moral principles. Thus, in private, one can be a pro-life activist, but in public must accept the liberal solution to the problem. This means that it is possible to be a consistent adherent of political liberalism only if one is willing to accept its comprehensive version. In addition, even liberalism itself, in the most fundamental question, i.e., that of justice reveals a sharp controversy. There is an important strand in the liberalism which considers Rawls’ philosophy as dangerous to a free society and this prompts us to express doubts, not just about liberalism’s ability to indicate the common ground for incompatible comprehensive views but about its capacity to define justice.
Słuszność a dobro w liberalizmie
Andryszczak, Piotr (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 2007)
There is an important strand in the liberalism called procedural which is based on the principle of the priority of the right over the good. According to it, as expressed in the Rawls’s fundamental work The Theory of Justice, individuals in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, do not know anything about their social location, talents and their own conceptions of the good. Due to such ignorance the persons would choose the society regulated by two principles of justice reflecting the priority of the right over the good. The critical approach to that proposition shows that the conception of the person deprived of the good is simply wrong. We are self-interpreting animals, which means that our identity depends on our self-understanding and that is not possible without the good because we define who we are in relation to the good which we find with others and in them. Man is not selfsufficient and any attempt to treat him so denies a crucial truth that he is a social animal and he cannot conceive his relationship with others in an atomistic terms. A purely instrumental view of society is misleading since it destroys both our communities and ourselves. Therefore we consider the liberal conception of person and society unacceptable and utopian because it refers to a person who does not exist and to a society which cannot survive.
Większość źródłem prawdy o dobru?
Andryszczak, Piotr (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 2018)
W naszych czasach polityka, dążąc do zbudowania państwa prawa, sięga często do opinii dominujących wśród większości obywateli. Źródłem prawa jest wtedy wola większości. Takie stanowisko, choć atrakcyjne, zawiera poważny błąd. W artykule został on krytycznie zanalizowany, a następnie zaproponowano rozwiązanie nieuwikłane w grę między większością a mniejszością.

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