Studia Ełckie, 2014, T. 16, nr 1

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Przeglądaj Studia Ełckie, 2014, T. 16, nr 1 wg Autor "Landowski, Witold"

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    Krytyka konwencjonalizmu społecznego na przykładzie filozofii społecznej T. Hobbesa i J. Locke’a
    Landowski, Witold (Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne Adalbertinum, 2014)
    The paper shows theoretical difficulties in Hobbes’ and Locke’s philosophical theory. The attempt at proving legitimacy of society hade been made by philosophers turned out to be pointless because of false anthropological presuppositions. Even though the term of human nature in axiological aspect is exremely negative in Hobbes’thought while neutral in Locke’s theory but both philosophers define man as a physical, self-directed, self-awareness individual. If such individuals in supposed state of nature have every rights and liberty then arises question of how assign such units to something other than individuals itself, this mean to public institution (state). The anthropological fallacy made the matter over much difficult and justification of social existence impossible, neither account of guarante civil safety do not justify the type of absolutist state or account of protection of property rights do not justify the type existence of liberal state, which has an insufficient competitives and power (minimal state). The state in both cases is rather an alienated from people, which treated public institutions and government as necessary evil in fact. It is since being based on the self preservation (Hobbes) or egoistic self – interest (Locke). In view on basis of social life, the philosophers failed to take spiritual and personal dimesion of human being. They did not notice that human nature is compositive, natural and rational inclinations to live with each others (in community) and humane desire for a versatile, personal development. According to fallacy their conception of society and state only partly is rational but it is a type of pragmatic rationality.