Roczniki Filozoficzne
Stały URI zbioruhttps://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/12375
Roczniki Filozoficzne są jednym z najstarszych filozoficznych czasopism naukowych w Polsce, ukazują się nieprzerwanie od 1948 roku. Obecnie są kwartalnikiem publikowanym zarówno w wersji elektronicznej, jak również w tradycyjnej wersji papierowej. Celem czasopisma jest publikowanie najlepszych, oryginalnych artykułów z dziedziny filozofii, a także przekładów, recenzji, sprawozdań i polemik. Wydawane jest przez Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL oraz Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II w Lublinie.
W repozytorium „Theo-logos” udostępniony jest tylko zeszyt 2: Filozofia moralności, filozofia religii.
Przeglądaj
Przeglądaj Roczniki Filozoficzne wg Temat "act"
Teraz wyświetlane 1 - 3 z 3
- Wyników na stronę
- Opcje sortowania
Pozycja Błąd naturalistyczny a prawo naturalne. Josefa Fuchsa krytyka tomistycznej koncepcji prawa naturalnegoMerecki, Jarosław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)In the paper the author analyzes the critique of the Thomistic theory of natural law put forward by a German theologian Josef Fuchs. The question Fuchs seeks to answer can be formulated as follows: In what sense nature can be called the basis of morality? Fuchs distinguishes three possible meanings of the term „nature”: 1) biological structure of man, 2) the specific essence of a given human act (e.g. a sexual act), 3) personal nature of man defined by his freedom and rationality. According to Fuchs, the Thomistic theory of natural law contains, at least in some of its modes of argumentation, an error called − after G. E. Moore − naturalistic fallacy. It consists in deducing normative conclusions from descriptive premises. Fuchs distinguishes three forms of this error. In the first form, biological laws are taken for moral norms. In the second, normative conclusions are inferred from the description of the specific essence of a given act. The third form of the same error can be called „theological fallacy”: it consists in not distinguishing between God s creative will and God s moral will. The present paper is focused on the distinction between different forms of the naturalistic fallacy objection. In his next paper the author will investigate to what extent this objection is valid as far as the structure of Thomistic ethics is concerned.Pozycja Czy wolno „kłamać z konieczności”?Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)Though a lie is usually considered as an evil, quite often a moral approbation achieve cases of the so-called “lie from the necessity”, when subject is convinced, that lie serves as an end to a goal. It is enough to mention the lie in defense of a secret or lie to defend one’s life. The question of the moral appraisal of acts, where the means have been chosen to achieve an end, was carefully analyzed by St. Thomas Aquinas, and his doctrine is a basis for this article. St. Thomas’s analysis of human acts proves that the mean (finis operis) chosen by the subject to achieve the goal (finis operantis) is neither morally indifferent, nor justified by the end itself. St. Thomas however permits actions, that bring about both good and bad effects but only when the means chosen for an end are within the proportional reason. It reason is proportional when there is no less harmful way of protecting the value here and now, therefore both means and the end must be proportional to the ultimate end. This condition never complies with the lie (cannot be referred to the lie), so St. Thomas allows here only a prudent concealing of truth, but unfortunately he doesn’t explain how he understands it. The prudent concealing of truth cannot negate the value of truth. It occurs when the good of the others demands the manifestation only part of the fact. The concealing of the truth can be immoral if some is called upon to be a witness. Especially difficult are those situations, where one is forced to unveil information to bad ends. Even the threat of death cannot justify the lie, though one must admit, that the guilt of the man who is lying in an especially difficult situation is different from the guilt of man who lies for some material benefit.Pozycja Logiczne relacje między moralnymi kwalifikacjami czynów ze względu na przykazania i radyHerbut, Józef (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Many moral (and juridical) systems are based on three evaluations of human behaviours: obligatory, forbidden, indifferent. The logical relationship between them can be illustrated using deontological hexagon. It is clear that supererogatory action is not adequately reflected in the three-dimensional framework. R. M. Chisholm (building on some ideas A. Meinong’s) deveioped a five-dimensional evaluative framework for the analysis of the human morality. He classifies actions as „obligatory”, „forbidden”, „indifferent”, „supererogatory”, „offensive” . However, that conceptual system is not totally consistent since „non-offensive” cannot be identified with the disjunction of „obligatory”, „forbidden”, „indifferent”, „supererogatory”. A complete and logical consistent systematization of our moral evaluations of actions can be obtained if we differentiate between coercive prescriptions (praecepta) and non-coercive advises (consilia). One must further differentiate between positive and negative prescriptions on the one hand, and on the other between positive advises („exhortations") and negative advises („dehortations”). In this way we have four evaluations of actions: „obligatory”, „forbidden”, „exhorted”, „dehorted”. Adding to these concepts „indifferent” and after that – their negations, we obtain ten evaluative concepts. The logical relations among them cam be illustrated with deontological decagon.