Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne, 1995-1996, T. 14

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Przeglądaj Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne, 1995-1996, T. 14 wg Temat "AI"

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    Monistyczna interpretacja genezy świadomości w ujęciu D.C. Dennetta (cz. 1)
    Wójcik, Bogusław (Instytut Teologiczny w Tarnowie, 1996)
    The problem of consciousness is very often debated in the contemporary philosophy. The main question concerns the relation between two different spheres of reality. In the case of the human being those relations are connected with the conception of the man as composition of body (rex extenso) and soul or mind (rex cogitons). The dichotomy popularized by R. Descartes is still present. Against this background one can read Dennett's book Consciousness Explained. In the article I attend to his attempts at resolving the Body-Mind Problem and new conceptions of consciousness as it emerges from Cognitive Science (CS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). In Dennett’s opinion science, psychology, philosophy, and AI can resolve the two great philosophical problems: consciousness and intentionality. The more fundamental issue concerns “rethinking of everything” Dennett’s notion of “rethinking” is the second main sphere of my interests. Methodology applied in Consciousness Explained has many connections with deconstruction in J. Derrida’s philosophical practice and postmodern characteristics of J.F Lyotard's thought. And this is the reason why many “scientific” arguments implemented by metaphors and comparisons are meant to replace old metaphors, for example Cartesian Theatre. It turns out that consciousness is a kind of undefined “Center of Narrative Gravity” It’s also part of Derrida’s vision of “words web” without a subject. The escape from rationalism and preference for a postmodern style of doing philosophy is a sign of crisis in Dennett’s analysis. Homuncular functionalism and semiotic monism are theories left behind because there are too many unresolved questions in Body-Mind Problem. Dennett rather mobilizes us to strong faith in his projects than gives reasons for knowledge based on arguments from AI or CS. As J. Searle put it: Cartesian Theatre exists even in Consciousness Explained but in new form – cryptodualism.
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    Ograniczenia sztucznej inteligencji w ujęciu Huberta L. Dreyfusa (cz. 2)
    Kloch, Józef (Instytut Teologiczny w Tarnowie, 1996)
    In this second part of my paper Limitations of artificial intelligence by Hubert L. Dreyfus is going about language translation and pattern recognition. In language translation, even the elements to be manipulated are not clear due to the intrinsic ambiguities of a natural language. Dreyfus set ambiguity tolerance against context-free precision. Word-by-word translation {mechanical dictionary) is possible for any computer but translating a natural language (understanding in context of use) is impossible. The order of the words in a sentence does not provide enough information to enable a machine to determine which of several possible parsings is the appropriate one. Also Bar-Hillel and Oettinger, two of the most respected workers in the field of automatic language translation, agree in their pessimistic conclusions concerning the possibility of further progress in the field. In pattern recognition, difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception (perspicuous grouping vs. character lists). These difficulties have brought to a standstill the first five years of work on Cognitive Simulation. A computer must recognize all patterns in terms of a list specific traits. This raises of exponential growth which human beings are able to avoid by proceeding in a different way. Any system which can equal human performance, must be able to distinguish the essential features of a particular instance of a pattern and take account of the context. Work in pattern recognition has had a late start and an early stagnation. Indeterminate needs and goals and the experience of gratification which guides their determination cannot be simulated on a digital machine whose only mode of existence is a series of determinate states. It is just because these needs are never completely determined for the individual and for mankind as a whole that they are capable of being made more determinate, and human nature can be retroactively changed by individual and cultural revolutions.