Analecta Cracoviensia, 1980, T. 12
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Pozycja Bezdroża spotkańTischner, Józef (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Kanonik krakowski ks. Jan Długosz o królowej JadwidzePerzanowski, Zbigniew (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Katalog inkunabułów Biblioteki Kapituły Metropolitalnej w KrakowieAntosiewicz, Klara (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Kościelne fundacje Jana DługoszaRożek, Michał (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja L’uomo creatore della storia secondo Konstanty MichalskiTelus, Jan (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Nieznany list Jana DługoszaPieradzka, Krystyna (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Rola zasad dedukcjonizmu i indukcjonizmu w kosmologii przyrodniczejŻyciński, Józef (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)In the paper the problem of limitations of classical methodological principles applied to relativistic cosmology is investigated. During the recent 20 years cosmology, conceived as a scientific theory of the structure and the evolution of the Universe as a whole, has been developing dynamically. This discipline has a specific epistemological status essentially different from other scientific disciplines. The uniqueness of the object investigated in cosmology, unrepeatibility of events in the history of the Universe as well as necessity to define global properties of the Universe on the basis of local observations in our “cosmic province” define the exceptional character of cosmology as a science. Consequently, methodological assumptions and principles of the philosophy of science are especially important in this discipline. In the contemporary philosophy of science, however, essential changes, similar to the changes in cosmology, have been actualising. The analyses of the historiography and the philosophy of science presented by I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend, M. Polanyi, and T. Kuhn destroy the myth in which science was conceived as an opposite of an irrational approach marked by a dogmatic and authoritarian attitude. In the view of these authors the process of scientific discovery does not imply either methodology or observation or common sense. The most important methodological rule proposed by Feyerabend is the rule „anything goes”. The mentioned authors prove that the conception of the fundamental role of the empirical data in science does not take into account the fact that bare empirical data do not exist and that, in reality, ail data are theory-laden. The dividing line between the elements of observation and of the theory is, in the concrete cases, very difficult to draw. In order to obtain a series of empirical data D which confirm a theory T, is necessary first to accept another set of theories T₁, T₂ ... Tₖ without which the interpretation of the data would not be possible. This circular character of reasoning is particularly evident in cosmology where e.g., on one hand, the confirmation of the so called cosmological principle is achieved by reference to observation of the remote regions of the Universe and, on the other hand, in order to obtain the data about the brightness or the position of the distant objects, the cosmological principle has to be accepted. On the basis of assumptions formulated by I. Lakatos in his Research Programmes methodology, in the paper the question is investigated, whether the traditional principles of inductivist or falsificationist methodology can be applied to cosmology. The possibility that different types of horizont can exist in the Universe implies the necessity of scientific study of events de iure unobservable for fundamental observers. The principle of ignorance formulated by S. Hawking as well as the principle of cosmological uncertainty defined by W. H. McCrea indicate the important limitations of empirical investigations in cosmology. In this context the attempts to prefer the principles of inductivism or operationism in cosmology are merely symptoms of an uncritical and unrealistic maximalism. The process of falsification, however, is not an easy task in epistemological frames of cosmology. The truth of consequences describing real physical phenomenon does not imply the truth of fundamental cosmological assumptions from which observational sentences are deduced. The maximazing tendencies in the attempts to falsify a theory on the basis of single experiments are exemplified by the effort to reject the theory of relativity by revoking the experiments by W. Kauffman and D. C. Miller. In both these cases the results of observations were inconsistent with the implications of the Einstein’s theory and for a long time (in the latter case 30 years) nobody could explain these inconsistencies. Notwithstanding isolated views that a knock-out blow had been dealt to the theory of relativity the majority of the scientists did not consider that the experiments falsified the theory of relativity. The passage of time has confirmed their attitude. These examples as well as the history of β decay interpretations or Prout’s programme evaluations illustrate a rule that the real falsification is a rare phenomenon in science. Usually it happens in these cases only when a competing theory exists which is better than the one being falsified. When such a theory is lacking, the hope that it will be introduced proves stronger than the penchant for falsification. As a rule instead of definitive falsification occurs probabilistic falsification called disconfirmation. As a result an uncritical character of the traditional opinions about the asymmetry between verification and falsification is evident. According to these opinions to verify a statement one has to investigate all its consequences, but to falsify it one needs merely one counterexample. Additional difficulties of falsification in cosmology are caused by the fact of unrepeatibility of cosmological events. In the most popular Popperian version of falsification repeatibility of events is a necessary condition of falsification. After critical analyses of traditional methodological principle in the paper the method of approximation is proposed as the most valuable heuristically method of cosmology.Pozycja Trwałość osiągnięć księdza profesora Konstantego Michalskiego jako historyka filozofii średniowiecznejKurdziałek, Marian (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Wypisy do biografii Jana Długosza z ksiąg sądowych Kurii Metropolitalnej w KrakowieKowalczykówna, Maria (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)Pozycja Zmiany postawy religijnej na przełomie XIX i XX wiekuMichalski, Konstanty (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1980)