Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne, 1977, T. 6
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Pozycja Elementy psychoterapii współczesnej a sakrament pokutySzewczyk, Władysław (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)The article presents connections between contemporary psychotherapy and Sacrament of Penitence. After introductory remarkes about the need of psychological sciences in pastoral care in general, and especially in m oral theology, the Author analyses connections between psychotherapy and Penitence in 3 aspects: a) self-cognition and insight at psychotherapy in relation to self-examination of conscience at Sacrament of Penitence b) culpability and guilt feeling at psychotherapy in relation to reteence of sins in Sacrament of Penitence c) elements of interpersonal contact at psychotherapy in relation to of Penitence. Author demonstrates, that Sacrament of Penitence is for religious people very good and effective mean satisfy natural tendency to expression one’s fault, and also to reduce guilt’s feeling. The confessors ought know well the principles of clinical psychology and psychology of personality for most effective help in sacramental confession.Pozycja Samorząd młodzieży w duszpasterstwie zespołu służby liturgicznejBochenek, Zygmunt (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Struktura opowiadania o teofanii na Górze Horeb (1 Krl 19)Brzegowy, Tadeusz (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Św. Efrem Syryjczyk a Kościół naszych czasówKania, Wojciech (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Przedmiot działalności „Caritas” w latach 1945-1950 na tle potrzeb polskiego społeczeństwaLisowski, Stanisław (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Duszpasterska troska o głuchoniemych w diecezji tarnowskiejNowak, Adam (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Z działalności Sekcji Koła Teologicznego w TarnowieBednarz, Michał (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Teologia IV Synodu BiskupówAblewicz, Jerzy (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Jeszcze o hipotezie śmierci cieplnej wszechświataHeller, Michał (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)W literaturze filozoficznej często pojawia się problem śmierci cieplnej Wszechświata. W niniejszym artykule dyskutuje się niektóre błędy i nieporozumienia dotyczące tego problemu. W historii hipotezy śmierci cieplnej można wyróżnić następujące fazy: 1) rozważania fenomenologiczne, 2) przejście do metod statystycznych, 3) sformułowanie relatywistyczne. Następną fazą będzie prawdopodobnie kwantowe potraktowanie zagadnienia. Problem śmierci cieplnej Wszechświata znalazł rozwiązanie w ramach relatywistycznej termodynamiki i relatywistycznej kosmologii. Drugie praw o termodynamiki w relatywistycznym sformułowaniu również podkreśla monofoniczny wzrost. entropii związany z procesami nieodwracalnymi. Jednakże w niestacjonarnych polach grawitacyjnych stan śmierci cieplnej nigdy nie zostanie osiągnięty. Z praw em w zrostu entropii w sposób istotny łączy się problem „strzałki czasu”. Niektóre, filozoficznie interesujące, aspekty tego problem u również zostały przedyskutowane.Pozycja Proces rozwoju dogmatu jako funkcja świadomości Kościoła w teorii Pawła Swietłowa (1961-1942)Kupiec, Kazimierz (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Theological reflection continually reinforced the understanding of nature and the factors and inner-laws leading the process of a deeper and deeper understanding of God’s message in the Church. A clearing up of the dogmatic progress, which is a manifestation of life and inner dynamism of the Church, has a fundamental ecumenical meaning. The reason for this is that the unity of faith in the visible community of the believers in Christ supposes the common acceptance of determined doctrinal content. The 19th century in which evolutionism triumphed and new catholic dogmas were proclaimed, also placed Orthodoxy before the problem of dogmatic progress. In Russian Orthodox Theology of this era, there exists a few streams clearing up this phenomenon. Traditional theology does not accept the possibility, of a new dogmatic definition since the last ecumenical council in 787, and a dogmatists attribute to dogma a symbolistic and pragmatic character. The theology of Chomjakov, especially in the interpretation of the neoslavophils, clearly heads in the direction of dogmatic relativism. Among the orthodox theologians of this era, V. Solov’ev and P. Svetlov endeavouring to overcome dogmatic conservatism and relativism, were the first thus far to introduce a deeper and more systematic reflection of dogmatic progress. P. Svetlov, apologist, ecumenist and disciple of A. Chomjakov, understands revelation as an event and living fact and faith as its living acceptance. In ecclesiology he accepts the idea of conciliarity (sobornost’) and the necessity of receiving decisions made by the council throughout the entire community of the Church. As far as dogmatic progress is concerned, P. Svetlov understands it, as it seems, as a process and function of the consciousness of the Church. Church consciousness is a super-personal reality and the harmony of consciousness of all the members of the Church, based on the unity of life and love in the Church. Exactly in this theandric consciousness, the Church touches ontological supernatural reality and grasps it in direct perception through experience. Next, it accomplishes conceptualisation and objectivation of preconceptual content of faith. Church consciousness embraces 3 aspects: consciousness of the faith of the Church, collective dogmatic consciousness, and individual consciousness. General consciousness of faith embraces the content of revelation taken through direct intuition of faith of the entire community of the Church. A certain part of the content of revelation is not only believed, but at the same time grasped in the concepts and expressed in the verbal structure of dogmatic formula (defined dogma), or it is still found in the stage of conceptual crystallization (truths not yet explained). That part of the content of revelation, which already is, or still is not the norm for faith and understanding of the members of the community of the Church, creates a collective dogmatic consciousness, in other words, doctrine of the Church. Collective consciousness is the primitive source of experience, faith and individual consciousness. It becomes the personal experience, belonging to particular individuals. The process of the assimilation of content of collective consciousness thru an individual, on the level of faith and reason, leads to an arising of theological thought. The consciousness of the Church can be considered in the statical and dynamic sense. The revealed content, grasped thru faith or also thru the mind of the Church, is absolutely unchangeable in its substance and constitutes the statical aspect of the consciousness of the Church. This consciousness is however at the same time one of the aspects of the life of the Church. This life of the Church continually trends toward the grasping and expression of its faith in the attainable concepts for human reasoning. The essence of consciousness in the dynamic sense depends on continual activity and – on the process of cognition of revelation, which is achieved in it. The process of dogmatic development covers 2 cycles. The first cycle of the process takes place between revalation grasped in a manner of preconceptual understanding thru experience in the consciousness of the faith of the Church, and its dogmatic consciousness. It concludes with a dogmatic definition. The second cycle of development is fulfilled between collective dogmatic consciousness and individual consciousness, and leads to individual understanding of the given dogma, in other words, to particular theological opinion. In sequence this opinion tends to be attested and verified by ecclesiastical tradition, and can become a starting point for a successful process of explaining dogma up to this point not yet explained. The integral process of dogmatic development depends therefore on a living and permanent circulation of truth in the Church. Thru new dogmatic formulations, the quantity of truth revealed and possessed thru the Church does not grow, but enriches only the supply of revealed truth at the same time explained in the Church, in other words, a logical cognition of faith grows and faith itself becomes more rational. In this process the Church expresses and continually verifys unity and identity of its truth, which is one of its outer-manifestations. The. process of dogmatic development just as dogma itself has a theandric character, because the divine and human, super-logic and logic elements harmoniously work together in it and create their synthesis. The collective conception of Church consciousness in Svetlov’s work, as it seems, deserves to bę critically evaluated. The reason for this is that, it is hard to accept the possibility of fusion of individual conciousness in one super-personal common consciousness of the community of the Church. Instead, Svetlov comes closer to contemporary theological thinking particularly in the concept of revelation and in general intuition of the process of dogmatic development. In this process revelation is not subjected to the law of evolution, but only human concepts are perfected and the reflective consciousness of faith in the Church is enriched. The theory of P. Svetlov shows influences of subjectivism of liberal theology and dependence on the ecclesiological mysticism of A. Chomjakov. The value in the theory of Svetlov is that he called attention: to the variety of factors in dogmatic development, to the historical and dynamic aspect of the message of God, and to its immanence and the necessity of reception of dogma in the community of the Church.Pozycja „Przedmiot” czy „rzecz w sobie” w klasycznej definicji prawdy na tle jej interpretacji w Szkole LowańskiejŚliwa, Paweł (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Posoborowe zmiany w zakresie prawa kanonicznego jako wyraz pewnych zasad leżących u podstaw zamierzonej odnowy KościołaDudziak, Jan (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Próba zastosowania samorządu Korczaka do duszpasterstwa ministrantówMitek, Eugeniusz (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Wychowanie w seminarium pastoralistów w Bochni i Tarnowie (1822-1838)Banach, Ryszard (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Znaczenie rodowodu Jezusa w Ewangelii MateuszaBednarz, Michał (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Studia w Seminarium Duchownym w TarnowieNowak, Adam (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)Pozycja Treści myślowe a poznanie (I)Regner, Leopold (Seminarium Duchowne w Tarnowie, 1977)The paper is concerned with the question of how the knowledge of external things depends upon the content of our acts of thought. The author distinguishes, after Bolzano, between the act and the content of apprehension, and he shares the opinion, that the one and only one way for knowing the external world – if the external world is at all know able – comes from the content of thought, that is, from the content of our acts of apprehension, or of cognition altogether. For we do not know immediately either the primary or secondary qualities of an external object, or our acts of perception, but only the content of our acts of thought. We may, perhaps, distinguish between the primary and secondary content of our acts of perception, but this distinction, even if justified, is for our purpose irrelevant. The method of present investigation is not an analysis of facts, but that of concepts, for the problem of know ledge cannot start, as Kant once did, from a fact of knowledge, since in this problem even the fact of knowledge is called in question. Since the one and only way of apprehending, perhaps, the external world comes from the content of our acts of thought, we ought to investigate: (I) what causes the content of acts of thinking, (II) if the contents of thought give us the knowledge of the external world, (III) if the contents of perceptions are true copies of external things. Since the contents of acts of thought, being neither physical events, nor psychological ones, belong to the domain of intentions, they are entirely beyond causes and beyond causality, at least beyond a physical ones. Moreover, since the act of thought is immanent, and every act of knowledge is an act of thought, neither an aid of knowledge, nor, a fortiori, the content of an act of knowledge may be caused by any external cause. For the immanency of an act consists in the fact, that the cause of an immanent act ought to be just the subject of this act. Since the subject of an act of knowledge is surely the mind, the cause of an act of knowledge ought to be only the mind. We ought to remark that the immanency is proper to the act of knowledge as well as – all the more so – to the content of this act, but for different reasons, namely as the psychological immanency in the former case, and as the epistemological immanency in the latter one. For that reason we ought to raise the question of if and how the mind perceives external beings, especially the material world. If we assume, that external things not only are existing, but also demand of a rational creature a suitable behaviour, we have to explain, how the mind may come into contact with the external world. In that case we ought to assume the existence of an intermediary between a mind and the external world. This intermediary would be a part of the external world, that is, such a part which would be under the control of the mind. This intermediary may be called the sensorium. Such a sensorium is, perhaps, no other being than a human body or a certain part of it. The mind perceives neither the external things, nor any states of its own sensorium, but, being in contact with its own body, it builds up its own world out of its own images, which it recalls from its own potentiality. This world is a mere fancy or an eidolon, which exists only for one and the only subject. This private world is a reply to the activities of the external world. Manipulating with our private world we are able, at least in some degree, to control the activities and states of our own body and to find a suitable manner of behaviour in the external world. The private world is, in fact, a mere fancy, but we have a natural propensity to make a projection, that is, objectification and externalization of that, which is, as a product of the activity of mind, in fact, only a subjective being. The mind extrapolates its own products into the domain of external reality, that is, it views its own mental images as objective reality. The mind, therefore, is not a merely passive principle of the acts of knowledge, but on the contrary, it is an active one. Hence we may travesty Heraclitus’ sentence, and say, that the mind enkindles the light for itself. What is, therefore, the value of the human knowledge, as it is concerned with the external world? Since we are knowing immediately only our own subjective world, we are able neither to compare this world with that objective one, nor even to assume that we experience external things as they are in themselves. If the expression “as they are in themselves” ought to mean that a thing may have any appearances (τάεǐδη) which do not appear, this expression seems to be contradictory or empty of meaning. For the expression “to experience external things as they are in themselves’, involves an assumption, that external things may have any appearances, which do not appear.