Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1989-1990, T. 37-38, z. 2

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    O Leszka Kołakowskiego interpretacji religii
    Boużyk, Małgorzata (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)
    The paper attempts at an all-embracing characteristic of L. Kołakowski’s interpretation of religion which religion he takes as a socially accepted cult of eternal reality. Thus comprehended religion should be, according to Kołakowski, clearly distinguished from science in its rationalistic and functional meaning, when science is meant to be a tool of subjecting the world to man. Religion then is a non-rational way of taming reality which is being realized not within the domain of science but myth. Myth involves the whole man, making the sense of his life relative to mythical reality; it demands total faith and acceptance of its requirements, and does not allow for any attempt of their rational justification. However, according to Kołakowski, one can find the presence of myth in any human activity, including the typically rational. Among various forms of myth, religion plays a particularly important and positive role, since it expresses the deepest human need of the existing someone who, while transcending the mundane dimensions, would make the world senseful, and at the same time would be a support for man and a living partner of the dialogue of love. In this manner Kołakowski criticizes any attempts at a rational justification of the existence of God (esp. the “five ways” of St. Thomas) and His attributes. He accepts, however, the postulate of God which postulate is “justified” by the mythic structure of human consciousness. Thus comprehended religion is an essential element of culture and it protects culture against the danger of secularization. Kołakowski’s interpretation of religion emerges from his basic philosophical option. Its element is, among others, a narrow, quasi-scientistic understanding of reality which understanding does not allow Kołakowski to “place” within its framework the philosophy in general and the philosophy of God in particular. Hence his interpretation of religion is burdened with the Kantian agnosticism and Marxian functionalism.
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    Leszka Kołakowskiego krytyka freudowskiej teorii kultury
    Chabrajska, Dorota (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)
    The present paper deals with the problem of the relation between Leszek Kołakowski’s theoretical considerations concerning the problem of culture and his specific analyses of particular cultural trends. The paper proves that Kołakowski’s critique of the psychoanalytical theory of culture included in his essay Psychoanalityczna teoria kultury (Psychoanalytical Theory of Culture) is extremely apt and that it hits the basic intuitions as far as this doctrine is concerned. It is impossible, however, to accept his critique in terms of Kołakowski’s standpoint on the nature and functions of culture, as they are presented in his work Obecność mitu (The Presence of Myth). That impossibility results from an inconsistency between the critical and the analytical trend of his thought. The lack of consistency manifests a tragic element inherent withi n Kołakowski’s philosophical approach. On the one hand, the core of his philosophy is focused on the negation of transcendence and of absolute values. On the other hand, however, he holds that such reality and such values are indispensable for the protection of culture against its crisis which is well under way.
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    Filozoficzne implikacje obiektywizmu w etyce
    Szostek, Andrzej (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)
    The paper defends a thesis that objectivism is a condition of sensibleness of pursuing normative ethics. On the basis of biblical and literary examples the author analyzes the experience of getting to know one’s own fault. He points that an essential element of such an experience is perception of the value of a person who suffered injustice. This discovery, being different from other (so-called scientific) discoveries, retains the character of a discovery. That is to say, the character of the perception of values which hitherto have not been perceived by the subject clearly enough, neither have been created by that subject. Such a character of the discovery of values justifies ethical objectivism and explains its sense. An objectivistic standpoint in ethics brings about, among others, three implications: 1. an adequate to the experience of a value conception of man as its carrier (its axiologic superiority over non-rational beings); 2. epistemological realism (including an ability to get to know values), and 3. contingency of a human being. Finally, the author points at the “incongruity” between the anthropological and ethical considerations which tend to a more profound cognition of man himself, and modern technical mentality, with which mentality the modern shape of culture is too much imbued.
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    Problem odnowy teologii moralnej w ujęciu Enrica Chiavacciego
    Czachorowski, Marek (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)
    The paper presents and criticizes Enrico Chiavacci’s standpoint concerning, generally speaking, the attitudes of morality which attitudes are to be the foundation of the new manner of pursuing moral theology. According to the author it was, first of all, the results of particular sciences that questioned the very possibility of morality. On the one hand, they seem to question the possibility of freedom which freedom is the foundation of morality. On the other hand, they question the existence of the absolute criterion of morality. In keeping with the first matter, the author thinks that modern science has yet not dismissed man’s freedom, though he defended this thesis at the expense of some groudless resignation from the rootedness of freedom in cognition. The second problem, though, is at the centre of Chiavacci’s interest. He accepts a thesis which thesis cannot be sustained, and which some representatives of particular sciences put forward. It is the thesis of a social and cultural conditioning of our cognition. In the light of this thesis he criticizes various possible forms of grounding the absolute moral norm of morality, including the well-known thesis in Thomistic ethics which thesis “sees” this norm in human nature. The epistemological thesis which Chiavacci assumed (and which thesis leads to his questioning, among others, the possibility of the existence of absolute norms, modification of the sense of natural law etc.) is not, however, consequently applied by him. Since he, as it were, gives it up (because of some unknown reasons, in the light of accepted assumptions) in his, roughly described, positive proposal of grounding the absolute criterion of morality on “the experience of basic values” and also on the reading out of Revelation.
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    Petera Knauera koncepcja wyboru moralnego. W sprawie kreatywizmu antropologicznego we współczesnej teologii moralnej
    Piechowiak, Marek (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)
    The author undertakes a critical analysis of the ethical views of Peter Knauer who is one of the most influential theological moralist today. The author tends to show the consequences of Knauer’s theory which consequences are destructive for morality. The first part of the paper presents Knauer’s standpoint in view of the conception of moral choice and shows three crucial points of his system. They are the following: the definition of moral good (rightness) in its relation to physical good; the reinterpretation of the principle of double effect which reinterpretation reduces that principle to its “teleological explanation”; and, finally, the conception of the so-called non-counterproductivity which decides whether an activity is right. That non-counterproductivity is comprehended as an all-embracing correspondence between the goals which the subject has chosen and means which the subject has taken in order to accomplish the goals. In the second critical part one finds some questions related to the immanent critique of the discussed theory and some consequences of Knauer’s claims. If one applies his assumptions strictly, it turns out that in his model of morality there is no place for such an activity of man which, at the same time, would be both rational and free, i.e., sensu stricto moral. In view of Knauer’s system the criteria of moral evaluation, which criteria he proposed, do not hold sense. Thus morality and ethics lose their essential normative character. Consequently, the system under scrutiny leads to an antipersonalistic vision of both an individual and society, and in terms of eternity it seems to dismiss the possibility of recognizing the existence of Absolute. The theory rejects values for the sake of which it was construed.
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    Socjobiologiczna koncepcja religii
    Krieger, Dariusz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1990)
    The present paper is based on E. O. Wilson’s standpoints. It discusses the main assumptions of sociobiology as well as an interpretation of religion which interpretation is given within the framework of sociobiology. Sociobiology is meant to be a standpoint according to which all cultural phenomena are determined by genetic factors in the process of evolutionary natural selection. In like manner Wilson comprehends religion, following E. Durkheim, as a group of socially accepted ways of behaviour, referring to sacrum in which he sees the culmination of social ties. He distinguishes three levels of religion: ecclesial (where a concrete shape of religion is being formed), ecological (which stimulates a religious group to expand) and genic (which shows a feedback between mutually stimulating ways of religious behaviour and a particular group of genotype). Wilson emphasizes manifold social benefits which accompany religion, yet on the other hand, he does not regard man as “homo naturaliter religiosus”. What is more, he sees religion as having a factor (at the cost of immediate benefits) inhibiting social progress, and that mainly because of illusory (untrue) religious beliefs. Among critical remarks, the paper stresses that Wilson’s theory is flawed by scientistic reductionism and materialistic, ontological and epistemological monism. Inadequacy of those philosophical premises in relation to religion causes that Wilson is unable to arrive at other, more profound dimensions of religion.
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