Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1993, T. 41, z. 2

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    Integracja Europy a problem zagrożenia wartości chrześcijańskich
    Grześkowiak, Alicja (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
    The tendencies for the integration of Europe have recently gained momentum. On the other hand there are strong action which impede these efforts or even make them impossible. The European experience points out that such an integration is possible only then when the European community is united around the values, which have grown out of Christianity, which are a common beritage of the believers and nonbelievers alike. These values have decided about the spiritual and cultural unity of Europe. Two great traditions of West and East make this unity. United Europe is also a Europe of Fatherlands which make it, and not just Europe-Fatherland. Each state has its own identity which makes its welfare, and Europe under unification cannot negate it. When one renunciates universal values, the identity of particular states, introduces the principles of moral relativism and „privatization” of morality as a criterium of the integration of Europe, then this process is doomed to fail. Some tragic events, which we are now witnessing, in Europe are a painful evidence.
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    Koncepcja miłości u świętego Jana od Krzyża
    Burzyńska, Justyna (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
    The problem of charity is a very essential part of the work of St John of the Cross (1542- 1591). His doctrine bore a practical aim. Namely, he meant to bring man to a unity with God. He had in mind above all such a unity which makes man similar to God (aside to this, be distinguishes a natural unity), which consists in a very close intimacy with man, that is, his natural powers of reason, his memory, and his will with God. In such a unity man becomes God through participation (not substantial, that is!) in divine acts of cognition and charity. The Holy Doctor is interested in charity first and foremost as a means to unity. While assuming the principle of the appropriateness and sufficiency of this means to accomplish the aim, he defines the nature of charity. If the latter is able to unite man with the divine reality, then it must be a spiritual power. How is this unity made? St John of the Cross states that charity has an innate power to make its subject similar to its object. The problem is to properly select the object. If the will turns to some lower good, then it remains at this objet's level. Thus it is important to purify and shape charity, on which problem the Holy Doctor dwells extensively. Being the power of the purified will turned to the most adequate Object (St John of the Cross talks about the openness of the soul's powers), charity becomes the main efficient power of the unity, making the subject similar to its object. Basically, the latter is the result of a cooperation between the faith (the cognitive order) and charity (the order of desire), but, ultimately, this is just charity that creates unity through its power to make things similar. According to St John of the Cross, charity (grasped in a way after the functional manner) appears as a spiritual power, a faculty of the soul which belongs to the wolitive order, and unites the soul in all its powers with God in a unity which makes the subject similar to its Object.
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    Chrześcijańskie widzenie cnoty
    Hauerwas, Stanley; Pinches, Charles (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
    We begin the article by criticizing views of the moral life which depend on the existence of a special sphere of moral obligation. As Christian theologians, we admit our preference for virtue thinking, for it considers not only what we do but who we are. Nonetheless, while virtue thinking is gaining popularity among Anglo-American philosophers, we have doubts about whether its proponents recognize that virtues make sense only when imbedded in particular historical communities. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre understands this, but as John Milbank’s criticisms reveal, his thought ultimately is more firmly rooted in Greek theories of virtue than in Christian beliefs, particularly those articulated by Aquinas regarding the centrality of charity, and its implications for Christian peacemaking.
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    Religia i polityka
    Zdybicka, Zofia J. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
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    Wartości chrześcijańskie (uwagi amatora)
    Bronk, Andrzej (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
    Since the concept of value was introduced in XVIII c. in economics it made a rapid career in other social sciences, philosophy, religion and everyday life too. Nowadays, it is used as a popular and fashionable word in many possible meanings probably filling some semantic vacuum. There is no clear, exact and commonly accepted definition of values and none of the philosophical − objective or subjective − theories of values is free from objections. The concept of Christian values inherits in present political and constitutional discussions in Poland all the vagueness and ambiguity of values themselves. The paper tries to clarify the general meaning of value in its philosophical history (Begriffsgeschichte) and to explain its ontological and epistemological status. By Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy values do not have their own existence but are attributes (modi essendi) of objective things. This holds somehow for Christian values too. The discussions upon the rational justification of the normativeness of Christian values have to include their embedment in Christian culture. Trying to identify and characterize the Christian values one has first to look at their genesis: the New Testament, Christian tradition and the religious behavior of the Christian believers themselves.
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    Ostateczne perspektywy ludzkiego bytu w ujęciu Gabriela Marcela
    Gazda, Jadwiga (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
    The problems of death and immorality in the philosophy of G. Marcel are linked with the analysis of a concerte existence, particularly of the spiritual acts of man, i.e., faith, hope, love and creative faitfulness. In Marcel's view man is the embodied self which incessantly transcends its own materiality. In the ontic structures of the human being there is an „ontological requirement” to be opened to a categorial „you”, and, ultimately, to the transcendent „You”, which makes the being complete. God is the source of man's spiritual acts which man performs while living on earth. He is also an „ontological counterbalance to death”, as it were, a warrant of the presence which lasts until death. At the moment of death the most perfect act of man finds its fulfilment, that is love. Only such conception of the ultimate perspective of man is, according to Marcel, a warrant of the sense of life values to which man serves.
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    Błąd naturalistyczny a prawo naturalne. Josefa Fuchsa krytyka tomistycznej koncepcji prawa naturalnego
    Merecki, Jarosław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993)
    In the paper the author analyzes the critique of the Thomistic theory of natural law put forward by a German theologian Josef Fuchs. The question Fuchs seeks to answer can be formulated as follows: In what sense nature can be called the basis of morality? Fuchs distinguishes three possible meanings of the term „nature”: 1) biological structure of man, 2) the specific essence of a given human act (e.g. a sexual act), 3) personal nature of man defined by his freedom and rationality. According to Fuchs, the Thomistic theory of natural law contains, at least in some of its modes of argumentation, an error called − after G. E. Moore − naturalistic fallacy. It consists in deducing normative conclusions from descriptive premises. Fuchs distinguishes three forms of this error. In the first form, biological laws are taken for moral norms. In the second, normative conclusions are inferred from the description of the specific essence of a given act. The third form of the same error can be called „theological fallacy”: it consists in not distinguishing between God s creative will and God s moral will. The present paper is focused on the distinction between different forms of the naturalistic fallacy objection. In his next paper the author will investigate to what extent this objection is valid as far as the structure of Thomistic ethics is concerned.
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