Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1994, T. 42, z. 2

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    Możliwość etyki
    Lonergan, Bernard J. F. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
    The presented text is an excerpt from B. J. F. Lonergan Insight. „A Study of Human Understanding” (New York 1992, p. 618-630). It prolongs the discussion of questions raised in earlier chapters on common sense and in the study of human development. It meets the issue in three steps. First, an attempt is made to work out such notions as the good, will, value, obligation. From this effort there follows a method of ethics that parallels the method of metaphysics and, at the same time, a cosmic or ontological account of the good. Secondly, the possibility of ethics is envisaged from the viewpoint of freedom and responsibility. The relevance of the canon of statistical residues is considered. The nature of practical insight, practical reflection, and the act of decision is outlined. The fact of man’s essential freedom and responsibility is concluded. Thirdly, the possibility of ethics is investigated from the further viewpoint of effective freedom. Is an ethics possible in the sense that it can be observed? Is man condemned to moral frustration? Is there a need for a moral liberation, if human development is to escape the cycle of alternating progress and decline?
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    Narodzić się, aby kochać. Jak ocalić tożsamość Europy?
    Styczeń, Tadeusz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
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    O metodzie „Miłości i odpowiedzialności” Karola Wojtyły
    Buttiglione, Rocco (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
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    Czy wolno „kłamać z konieczności”?
    Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
    Though a lie is usually considered as an evil, quite often a moral approbation achieve cases of the so-called “lie from the necessity”, when subject is convinced, that lie serves as an end to a goal. It is enough to mention the lie in defense of a secret or lie to defend one’s life. The question of the moral appraisal of acts, where the means have been chosen to achieve an end, was carefully analyzed by St. Thomas Aquinas, and his doctrine is a basis for this article. St. Thomas’s analysis of human acts proves that the mean (finis operis) chosen by the subject to achieve the goal (finis operantis) is neither morally indifferent, nor justified by the end itself. St. Thomas however permits actions, that bring about both good and bad effects but only when the means chosen for an end are within the proportional reason. It reason is proportional when there is no less harmful way of protecting the value here and now, therefore both means and the end must be proportional to the ultimate end. This condition never complies with the lie (cannot be referred to the lie), so St. Thomas allows here only a prudent concealing of truth, but unfortunately he doesn’t explain how he understands it. The prudent concealing of truth cannot negate the value of truth. It occurs when the good of the others demands the manifestation only part of the fact. The concealing of the truth can be immoral if some is called upon to be a witness. Especially difficult are those situations, where one is forced to unveil information to bad ends. Even the threat of death cannot justify the lie, though one must admit, that the guilt of the man who is lying in an especially difficult situation is different from the guilt of man who lies for some material benefit.
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    Epistemologie postmodernistyczne a racjonalność przekonań religijnych
    Sweet, William (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
    How can the religious believer respond to the challenge posed by Richard Rorty’s postmodern critique of traditional epistemology? In a recent exchange of essays with Kai Nielsen, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and meaning of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern (specifically, Rortyan) in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss what I take to Hart’s central claims. While Harts does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief − aspects often overlooked by many critics − I suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides and that it is not clear that he ultimately avoids adopting a variant of the foundationalism he explicitly rejects.
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    Kategoria dziejowości w hermeneutyce i w filozofii klasycznej
    Bronk, Andrzej; Majdański, Stanisław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
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    Etyka a stosunki międzynarodowe
    Smith, Michael Llewellyn (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)
    The author speaks not as a philosopher but as a practitioner of foreign policy, drawing on his own experience of international relations and on his observations of current events − for example in Europe. The speech covers three different issues. The first one is “ethics and the foreign policy practitioner”: how, if at all, ethical considerations bear on diplomats in their work? Some principle of action is necessary and better than none, and, in the world as it is, no principle resting on a broader criterion such as the interest of the entire human race is a conceivable basis for action by states. In the last analyses, foreign policy makers must judge particular cases in the particular circumstances of the structure of international relations in which they find themselves. Ethical criteria, or rules of conduct, can only be guidelines. Moral and ethical judgements must always be particular. The second issue is that of “ethics and institutions, or forms of organization”: do particular forms of organisation of human communities have value? Can one form be “better” than another? When common decisions have to be reached by a number of separate states which still have different interests and perceptions, they become subject to compromises and trade offs. This is an inevitable part of the process of creating, gradually, a common foreign policy; but there are disadvantages as well as advantages in making policy on a broader basis than that of the national state. In the final part of his speech, concerning “ethics and intervention”, the author touches on some current problems and the ethical dilemmas they rise; in particular the question of intervention in the internal affairs of states. One of the features of the modern world is a great demand for intervention in the internal affairs of states whether on humanitarian grounds or to stop bloodshed. Should these pressures be resisted, and what are the ethics of intervention? Should there be a right of intervention for the relief of humanitarian distress, or for the prevention of terrorism, or for the weapons of mass destruction, or for other reasons? International law and the fabric of the UN may be imperfect and incomplete, but they are all that we have as a framework for the relations of states. It is difficult to conceive a strong enough reason for setting them aside or going beyond them. How should a diplomat approach difficult ethical decisions which arise in his work? The author’s belief is that a diplomat should study history, weigh up the consequences of his actions as best as he can (and there can be no certainty) and be fully alive to the effects that disasters, environmental and human, far away may have on the interests and his own country. That means also trying to educate his own public opinion, because the politician cannot move far beyond what his public opinion will allow. That is both the dilemma and the strength of democratic politics.
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    Bernharda Weltego rozumienie religii w świetle jego filozofii
    Mazanka, Paweł (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994)