Problem początku ludzkiego życia na tle sporu o istotę człowieczeństwa

Abstract

Although scientific progress, especially in biology and genetics, continues to bring about new bioethical problems, they are all related to the same human, whose medical well-being has been protected by the Hippocratic oath ever since the 5th century BC. At present, no ethical theory fails to express its deep concern about the good of the human being. If, despite their unanimously declared concern for human welfare, ethical theories do vary widely as to what they regard as morally good, it is because they differ fundamentally in their understanding of the essence of humanity. Contemporary moral philosophy offers a fairly large number of mutually exclusive concepts of person. With regard to bioethical dilemmas, the ongoing dispute over the notion of person is basically related to the way in which particular concepts view the relationship of what is ‘personal’ to what is ‘human’, more specifically defined as the nature of the Homo sapiens species. Attempts to separate the ‘human’ element from the ‘personal’ one ignore the fact that being a person involves living a human life. The two questions: ‘Is every human a person?’ and ‘When does a human start to be a person?’ are strictly interrelated, and answers by supporters of the different concepts of person will depend on what the given concept regards as fundamental for the status of the person.