Metafizyczne uwarunkowania analogicznego języka religijnego

Abstract

Analogy and metaphor are central to human thought. They figure in discovery, they are also used in teaching. We seem to think of it as a natural human skill, and of its use in science as a straightforward extension of its use in commonsense reasoning. Therefore it is not surprising that analogy was first develop for theological purposes long before the advent of scientific thought. And yet the rise of Western science brought a challenge to analogical thinking in theology. Wittgenstein in his Lecture on Ethics put it in familiar terms: “In ethical and religious language we seem constantly to be using similes. But a simile must be the simile for something. And if I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts without it. Now in our case as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts”. We argue that Wittgenstein is wrong in assuming our total ignorance in theological matters. Although our theological concepts are of our own making they still are able to convey some reliable knowledge. In order to justify this claim, however, we need to ban nominalism from theology.