Geometria a klasyczna koncepcja prawdy

Abstract

Starting points of geometry date from time being within human everlasting memory. Axiomatised by Euclid and know as the Euclidean one, geometry was treated until the end of the 18th century as a set of absolutely true statements about real space. One of the axioms aroused the remarkable interest. Two centuries of trials to prove this axiom from the other ones became unsuccessful. In the 19th century it became clear it to be independent from them. Consequently, there can exist geometries built on a denial of the above mentioned axiom, i.e. the non-Euclidean geometries are possible. Thus, the Euclidean geometry has lost its hitherto existing position. It has ceased to be the only possible one, it has become to be one of possible geometries. This meta-scientific fact has widened our mental horizons, namely: 1) it has enlarged a denotation of the term "geometry", 2) it has shown it to be possible only to talk about an "internal” truth when concerning geometry taken in itself, 3) it has taught only experience to be able to decide which kind of geometry is valid in the physical space; so we cannot refuse the correspondence theory of truth.