Analecta Cracoviensia, 1977, T. 9
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Przeglądaj Analecta Cracoviensia, 1977, T. 9 wg Autor "Kłósak, Kazimierz"
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Pozycja Z teorii filozofii BogaKłósak, Kazimierz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1977)In this paper the theory of the philosophy of God is presented and some detailed corrections to the solution published in the article „Próba uwspółcześnienia Tomaszowej argumentacji za istnieniem Boga z przyczynowości sprawczej” [An attempt to modernise St. Thomas’ argumentation for existence of God regarding the idea of efficient causality] are introduced. (See „Studia z filozofii Boga” [Studies in Philosophy of God] vol. II, Warszawa 1973, ed. by Bohdan Bejze, pp. 212–213). In the present approach, regardless the opinions of some contemporary neothomists, the possibility to use the term „philosophy of God” is shown. The forementioned philosophical discipline can be treated as distinct from metaphysics in which one regards an abstractly conceived being as such. In this theory the problems of transcendence can be studied within the philosophical perspectives, whereas in the approach supported by some neothomists the proper object of philosophical studies is only the world of finite beings. Next is mentioned the evident epistemological and methodological pluralism in the philosophy of God. This pluralism is a result of attempts to take into consideration – in starting point of the philosophy of God – not only metaphysical statements concerning the being as such, but also conclusions formulated in science and philosophy of nature. The necessity to introduce similar conclusions in especially obvious in the care of kinetic argumentation for existence of God.Pozycja Zagadnienie filozoficznej argumentacji za początkiem czasowym wszechświataKłósak, Kazimierz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1977)The main thesis of the paper, formulated at the level of philosophy of nature, states the impossibility to prove philosophically the very beginning of the Universe. When the nature of time in Aristotle’s and St. Thomas’ apprehension is regarded or when the known properties of events as well as the nature of the succesive set are analysed, we have no foundation to deny the possibility of the eternal existence of the Universe. Nevertheless, this thesis should be studied also in the perspectives of metaphysics and philosophy of God, where one may analyse the reductive ontological implications concerning ultimate justification, which enables the existence of an actually infinite set of events in past history of the Universe. Now I return to some aspects of my argument presented in first part of my book „W poszukiwaniu Pierwszej Przyczyny” [„In Search of the First Cause”] Warszawa 1955, pp. 69–89. Contained in this argument is a mental experiment, where going back into the past one could not state at any particular event that a set of events actually infinite a parte ante had been actualised. A similar statement would not be admissible because the above mentioned set of events could not have contained any event (rsp. events) absolutely first as its boundary. In this mental experiment we approach to an ontological impossibility characteristic for the autonomously treated set of events succesively actualised. However, this impossibility would have not occured if the Universe had been created ab aeterno, because atemporal God might have created the Universe containing in its the actually infinite set of events.

