Analecta Cracoviensia, 1982, T. 14
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Pozycja Okres przełomowyUsowicz, Aleksander (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)The article expounds three questions. The first question discuss the elements of the turning period: difficult situations, human response toward the particular challenge, profound transmutations in social life. The second question treats truth – value and civil liberty – values in the turning period. The third question presents the difference between the revolutionary process and the turning period process.Pozycja Problem koncepcji filozofiiJaworski, Marian (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Rola idei naśladowania Chrystusa w teologii moralnej F. TillmannaChmura, Tomasz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Prawo przyrodzone w empirycznym ujęciuBednarski, Feliks (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Praktyka życia duchowego w ujęciu o. Stefana Kucharskiego (1595–1653)Wider, Dominik (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Pozycja świeckich w pracach papieskiej komisji odnowy Kodeksu Prawa KanonicznegoDyduch, Jan (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Chrystologia i eklezjologia w wykładzie teologii fundamentalnejKubiś, Adam (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Teologia i Urząd NauczycielskiBeinert, Wolfgang (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Ewolucja pojęcia masyHeller, Michał (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)The term „mass”, as being non-operational, does not belong to the vocabulary of physics. Nevertheless it is often believed that physics is a „science about matter” and that the concept of mass is an operationistic counterpart of the concept of matter. The evolution of the mass concept is studied. It is shown that the concept of mass in contemporary physics has nothing in common with that of matter. Some remarks concerning the notion of energy are made.Pozycja W poszukiwaniu kulturyMichalski, Konstanty (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja De Christi humana scientia et conscientiaRóżycki, Ignacy (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Zagadnienie możliwości falsyfikacji twierdzeń w filozofii przyrodyŻyciński, Józef (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)According to the traditional approach philosophical statements can be neither falsified nor confirmed empirically because of epistemological differences between philosophy and science. In spite of this tradition Prof. K. Kłósak in his metatheoretical contributions to the philosophy of nature presented a theory of ontological implications for scientific statements. Accepting epistemological differentiations between science and philosophy he outlines in the theory 3 various methods enabling empirical confirmation of philosophical statements. In the paper presented here the author develops Kłósak’s ideas investigating possibilities of falsification of philosophical statements using empirical counterexamples. Very often general statements of the philosophy of nature, are formulated on the basis of the common sense observations extrapolated universally. These extrapolations can be false when applied to extreme states of matter, e.g. near the cosmological singularity, inside of the event horizons, etc. Scientific data can be useful in the philosophy of nature in order to reveal baseless generalisations and to introduce new interpretations omitted in simplified philosophical solutions. In order to illustrate this procedure concrete examples of falsification of philosophical statements are presented. The author does not accept an epistemological anarchism in which scientific and philosophical terms could be mutually mixed. However, he does not accept either a specific modification of T. Kuhn’s incommensurability theory in which languages of philosophy and science are to be mutually untranslatable.Pozycja Meta-SobórDelhaye, Philippe (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Znaczenie bożogrobców miechowskich w kształtowaniu romańskiego KrakowaTobiasz, Mieczysław (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Personalistyczny charakter norm etyki seksualnej według kardynała Karola WojtyłyGubała, Wacław (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Kryzys dojrzewania jako problem psychologicznyPiszkalski, Henryk (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pozycja Elementy koncepcji przyczynowości w wizji świata Piotra Teilharda de ChardinWciórka, Ludwik (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)Pierre Teilhard de Chardin did not systematically elaborate the idea of causality. Considering chronology, three approaches to the mentioned question can be found in his works. The first of them is connected with the, by him developed, unity metaphysics and formulated in essays from the time of the 1st world war, namely in La lutte contre la multitude and in L’union creatrice. The cause, in such apprehension, is before all the cause of unification of being. Teilhard de Chardin leans here toward identifying the causative cause with formal one, refering but to Aristotelian tradition, which identified the activity of formal cause with the cantering of being unity. Teilhard de Chardin tries to handle the causality problem in another way in the essay Sur la notion de transformation creatrice. He refers here to the classic conception of causative activity. In such apprehension vanishes the question of unifying cause. Teilhard de Chardin stresses but the necessity of extending the creative influence of Primary Cause to all in the world occurring processes, the result of which is the development of qualitatively new being. The third approach to causality question appears, explicitly formulated, in Le phenomene humain. He limits here the sense of causative bond to the successing events and does not inquire into extra-phenomenal causative-consecutive connections. Such attitude corresponds with the represented by him tendency to construct the „scientific phenomenology of cosmos”. However, he did not avoid metaphysics. Even but in such apprehension there is evident the, adumbrated in the scope of unity metaphysics, conception of unifying activity, expressed by the „law of consciousness – compositeness”.Pozycja Zagadnienie teorii filozofii przyrodyLubański, Mieczysław; Ślaga, Szczepan W. (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)The authors attempt a characteristic of K. Kłósak’s work on philosophy of nature against the background of comparative analysis of various concepts of philosophy of nature. They seek for the theory which is most adequate to reality and will best satisfy contemporary man. The multiplicity of concepts of philosophy of nature is methodologically conditioned by acceptance of certain preliminary assumptions which effect the whole system of theorems and the way in which they are substanciated. Among these theorems, the decisive role is played by different ways of understanding science and rules of classifying sciences. Hence, we classify the very concepts of philosophy of nature into traditional and autonomous ones depending on the acceptance of the old or the modern theory of science and rules of classification of sciences. The traditional concepts of philosophy of nature, e. g. those of J. Gredt, P. Hoenen, F. Dougherty, Ph. Selvaggi, A. Meisen, have not really succeeded in assessing its relation to natural sciences and to metaphysics. Autonomous concepts, e. g. those of Maritain or K. Kłósak are attempts of fundamental practice of philosophical cognition of science and thus ascertaining for it a methodological status or field of studies at least comparatively autonomous. The authors have characterised Kłósak’s theoretical assumptions and metatheoretical concepts and assessed his definition of the subject matter of philosophy of nature as „a science concerning the aspect of existence in reality as the type of subjects which constitute nature”. To define the cognitive-theoretical assets of K. Kłósak’s concept, it is compared to contemporary means of philosophical reflection, among others on the example of Z. Augustynek’s philosophical reflections on time and systemic ontology. Comparative analyses of this kind have proved that this specific practice in philosophy is based on particular sciences without limiting them to their empirical characteristics. It is aimed at subject studies of ontological nature and base view of structures and processes. It is characterised by a certain ontological openness. Kłósak’s concept has much in common with the specific style of contemporary, first of all with ankering it, i.e. making it a subject of natural sciences. However, it goes much deeper and creates a coherent original theory in which ontological theses are neither simple conventions, nor contextual elements of the theory to be proved empirically, but ontological implications reductive in character. The conclusion points to the fact that Rev. Kłósak’s chief attempt is to present the specificity of philosophy of nature and its autonomous character, with respect to natural sciences and metaphysics. Though it is built and constructed in the arising manner, philosophy of nature presented in this way is to explicate in a specifically ontological manner the material reality.Pozycja Typy wiedzy teoretycznejKamiński, Stanisław (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)In the paper epistemological characteristics relating to various kinds of theoretical knowledge are presented. In spite of dominance of physics in the contemporary scientific paradigm one can distinguish many types of unphysical disciplines dealing with fundamental theoretical problems. The author analyses relationships between theoretical and practical knowledge taking into consideration principles of deductivism, inductivism, and reductionism. Having presented .pluralism of principles accepted in contemporary philosophy of science the author indicates the relativisation of assessments in this domain to specific purpose of given types of knowledge.Pozycja Końcowe dzieje Polskiej Kongregacji Benedyktyńskiej św. Krzyża (1772–1864)Kanior, Marian (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1982)

