Analecta Cracoviensia, 1991, T. 23
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Pozycja Analiza doświadczenia Boga w „nowej fenomenologii”Jarnuszkiewicz, Antoni (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Czy chrześcijanin ma prawo żywić nadzieję dotyczącą tego świata? Rozważania o pojęciu łaski jako nadziei w obliczu zagrożenia naszej egzystencji na ziemiSeigfried, Adam (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Czy pojęcie Boga osobowego może być pojęciem regionalnym?Węcławski, Tomasz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Das Altarsakrament in philosophischer SichtWojciechowski, Tadeusz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Dogmatyczne podstawy ideału chrześcijanina w „Mowach” św. Leona WielkiegoPanuś, Kazimierz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Filozofia religii a filozofia Boga i metafizykaZdybicka, Zofia J. (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)In order to describe the existing philosophical knowledge about God and religion the author examines present-day speculations on religion. At the outset she analyzes a variety of approaches to philosophy of God and philosophy of religion, and devides them into two tendencies of practising and lecturing on philosophy of God: (1) philosophy of God closely related to metaphysics, (2) philosophy of God as independent of metaphysics. On the other hand, philosophy of religion can be: (1) descriptive, (2) interpretatory, and (3) explanatory. The author notices that the variety of philosophy of God and philosophy of religion results from richness of the religious phenomenon itself and life interests as well as the cognitive capacity of man. The second part of the article explores philosophy of God and philosophy of religion on the background of classical philosophy which separates philosophy of religion from metaphysics and philosophy of God. Philosophy of religion, however, refers to philosophical anthropology and metaphysics in order to show the subjective and objective ontological factors of religion. The author reaches a conclusion that an authentic religious life grows not from theories on religion but from facts-acts, especially prayer, sacrifice and morality.Pozycja Gabriel Marcel i perspektywy filozofii religiiTarnowski, Karol (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Genetyczne uwarunkowania religii w ujęciu radykalnej socjobiologiiŻyciński, Józef (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)The paper deals with epistemological and ontological presuppositions underlying sociobiology in its most radical version developed by E. O. Wilson, M. Ruse and C. J. Lumsden. Sociobiologists are far from being a uniform group with respect to their metaphysical views. Authors as remote as Hume and Plato, Hegel and Kant are referred to as authorites in philosophical comments to sociobiological analysis of human culture. Many radical interpretations proposed in the language of analogies and metaphors by Wilson were later either made more precise by his colleagues or moderated by Wilson himself. Despite the revisions introduced, an invariably controversial issue remains ontological reductionism according to which the content of human culture, religious beliefs and mathematical theorems inculded, is to be generated by biological determinants. On the level of epistemology, this reductionism implies an iconclastic theory of knowledge in which the classic notion of objective truth must be called into question, because „true” is to mean nothing but „useful in the evolutionary struggle for survival.” It is impossible to question that our knowledge can really facilitate our struggle for survival. However, the main problem remains, whether a given fact is true because it is useful for human survival or rather is it valuable in the struggle for survival because it is true. Wilson and Ruse definitely chose the first alternative when they accentuate the role of illusions in our apparently rational convictions. The illusions resulting in new mythology are to be the essential element determining the content of our religious convictions. The human species functions better because of religiously motivated principles of altruism, detachment and self-sacrifice. As a matter of fact, the principles in question are to be nothing but „a shared illusion of the human race”, the illusion „produced by our genetic code to facilitate our social coexistence”. In this approach of radical sociobiology, human beings with their trust in science and rationality are to be ruled by myth and involved in mythopeietic activities. The myth assumes different forms in political-ideological debates and in mathematical discussions on the status of the axiom of choice. Its particular expression is found in religion where the sociobiological attempt to explain the „traditional religion by the mechanistic models of evolutionary biology” is to lead „to the crux of the role of mythology in modern life”. If the essence of sociobiological epistemology is restricted to the weak thesis claiming that our knowledge has important genetic determinants, only defenders of the naive theory of the theory of tabula rasa would object to such a standpoint. If, however, the examined epistemology implies a strong determinism in which the so called objective content of our culture is to be determined by genes, its acceptance would result in denial of rational heritage of our species. To notice groundless simplifications of such a procedure, one may refer to comparative analysis and take into consideration the status of corresponding generalizations practiced in 19th century science. There is an obvious analogy between the sociobiological explanation of culture and the optimistic belief of 19th century mechanists in possibility of physical explaining the cultural phenomena. This optimism is evident in bold extrapolations of Ludwig Boltzmann who claimed categorically: „The application of mechanics is extended to the area of what is spiritual. ... Not only human memory is mechanical in nature, but also beauty and truth. .. .The origin of the concepts of truth and beauty should be explained within the context of mechanics”. When in Boltzmann’s declaration one replaces „mechanics” by „sociobiology” and „mechanical” by „genetic”, we obtain the strong sociobiological thesis which already became the object of most ardent debates. One should not, nevertheless, expect future replacement of religion by science, because science itself is only an alternative mythology in which one may enjoy the epic of cosmic evolution. The romantic and poetical component of this epic is supposed to be particularly manifest in relativistic cosmology where the theory of the big bang and the billions of years of the cosmic evolution play for contemporary man the same psychological role as the Iliad played for ancient Greeks. The privileged position of sociobiology consists thus only in the fact that this discipline „can account for the very origin of mythology by the principle of natural selection acting on the genetically evolving material structure of the human brain”. After denying our intellectual privileges, Ruse treats both mathematical theorems and religious beliefs only in pragmatic-aesthetical categories and, consistently, considers basic principles of theoretical physics, for instance Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, merely as pragmatic devices introduced to bar „the asking of awkward... questions”. It is possible to examine empirically the evolution of religious beliefs and to determine the rate of the „growing awareness” of their genetic determinants. One is thus entitled to expect that Wilson will furnish references to empirical investigations that confirm the basic thesis of the evolutionary utility of religion. Instead of the expected references to empirical data, one finds, however, only self-referential arguments in which the „growing awareness” denotes the growing awareness of the champions of sociobiology. Many objections formulated against sociobiological explanation of the genesis of religious beliefs refer only to Wilson’s version of sociobiology and Ruse’s variant of sociobiological epistemology. The presented criticism does not justify radical rejection of moderate solutions in which some sociobiological assumptions would be combined with a version of epistemological realism. The same restriction refers to theological ramifications of sociobiology. As Arthur Peacocke rightly emphasizes, the anti-theistic declarations of leading representatives of sociobiology could be easily eliminated and the very emphasis on genetic aspects of evolution would pose no problem for the Christian philosopher who conceives God as the immanent Creator acting in the stuff of the universe. Analysis of possible mutual relationships between the sociobiological and Christian philosophy of nature remains practically impossible unless basic assumptions of sociobiology are precisely formulated.Pozycja Głoszenie światła przez zmartwychwstałego Chrystusa (Dz 26,22 – 23)Chłąd, Stanisław (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Język filozofii a problem nie-śmiertelnościVeken, Jan van der (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)In the cognitive perspective offered by Whiteheadian process philosophy, a new possibility arises to develop the concept of objective immortality that was proposed by Whitehead himself in his paper on imortality delivered at the Harvard Divinity School on April 22, 1941. When traditional doctrines about afterlife have lost much of their credibility, for both non-believers and believers, at least part of the reason is that the language in which those doctrines are couched has remained uninterpreted. The paper proposes a solution that contains a conflation of Ian. T. Ramsey’s analysis of the language of immortality and Whitehead’s metaphysical position on universal relatedness. The author reserves the word ‘person’ and ‘personal order’ for routes of occasions which are distinctively human. In this approach it is meaningful to talk about the „immortality” of man and the superjective nature of all past occasions since in God’s consequent nature the coordination of many personal individualities occurs.Pozycja Kierkegaard a filozoficzne dowody na istnienie BogaSzwed, Antoni (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Konfesyjna nauka religii w publicznej szkole zsekularyzowanego społeczeństwaLange, Günter (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Ludwik Feuerbach a transcendentalna metoda w krytyce religiiSchaeffler, Richard (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Marcin Buber o możliwości objawieniaŻak, Adam (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Mysterium septiformis ecclesiaeKalinowska, Janina (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Nauka a wiara w okresie popozytywistycznymHeller, Michał (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)It is argued that the problem commonly known as the faith and science problem is interesting not only because of its apologetic aspects, but also because of its manifold contributions to better understanding some fundamental tenets of Christian religion. After the fall of the logical positivism, the „world of science” shows a growing interest in philosophy and seems to be more open for a dialogue with theology. Some conditions for such a dialogue, on both sides, and actual tendencies are explored.Pozycja Nauka o przyjmowaniu Ducha Świętego w komunii eucharystycznej według Ojców syryjskichCzęsz, Bogdan (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Pięćdziesiąt lat działalności benedyktynów tynieckich (1939 – 1989)Kanior, Marian (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Późnogotycki ołtarz św. Katarzyny Sieneńskiej z kościoła oo. Dominikanów w KrakowieOtto, Maria (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)Pozycja Realizm naukowy a teologiaHuyssteen, Wentzel van; Skoczny, Włodzimierz (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, 1991)In this article the epistemological credibility of the theological theory formation is examined against the background of emerging recent scientific realism. A discussion of the necessity of theological interaction with philosophy of science leads to the difficult problem of reference or reality depication in theological theories, and to an analysis of the present discussion on scientific realism. In this analysis special attention is drawn to the fact that in all forms of realism ontological claims imply that something can be inferred about real structures that are at present out of our epistemological reach. Against this background the necessary and central role of metaphors and models in science is disussed and linked to the criterion of fertility regarding all scientific explanations. Eventually the complicated problem of the reliability and the epistemological status of theological knowledge is discussed within the context of critical realism in theology. Special attention is given to provisional criteria for realism in theology, and eventually to the two central problems for any form of realism in theology: (a) the role of religious or faith commitment in theological reflection; (b) the problem whether models, which are as indispensable in theology as they are in science, can also in a meaningful way be regarded as explanatory and thus as progressive and successful.