Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1999, T. 47, z. 2
Stały URI dla kolekcjihttps://theo-logos.pl/handle/123456789/12534
Przeglądaj
Przeglądaj Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1999, T. 47, z. 2 wg Tytuł
Teraz wyświetlane 1 - 20 z 28
- Wyników na stronę
- Opcje sortowania
Pozycja „Ale nam się porobiło”Gałkowski, Jerzy W. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The paper is a brief commentary John Poul II’s address delivered in the Polish parliament, on 11th June 1999.Pozycja Bibliografia prac s. prof. dr hab. Zofii Józefy ZdybickiejPtaszek, Robert T. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Professor, Sister Zofia J. Zdybicka has been a head of the Philosophy of Religion Department at Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) since 1973. She undertook her studies on the Department of Christian Philosophy of KUL in 1956 and continued them until 1961. In 1965 she defended her doctoral thesis on „Philosophical grounds of cognizability of God according to Henri de Lubac”. She became Assistant Professor in 1970 with her habilitation thesis „The participation of being. A trial on understanding the relation belween God and the world”. She received tuition at Catholic University of Louvain (1972), Leuven (1981), and Yale University (New Haven – USA 1977/78). In the years of 1980-1984 she was a head of Theoretical Philosophy Section. She has been a Dean of the Department of Christian Philosophy of KUL since 1990 up to the present moment. She is a member of the Research Council of John Paul II Institute and a member of Episcopal Council for Culture. She has been Mother Superior of the Centre of Lublin Order of the Ursulan Sister of the Heart of the Dying Jesus. She is a representative of the Lublin Philosophical School, an author of the holistic interpretation of the religious fact in the sphere of classical philosophy of being, which makes philosophy of religion an independent branch of research in the system of realistic philosophy. Her interests are revolvinground the problems connected with God (participation theory, the problem of God cognition, etc.). Apart from historical and systematic considerations she has been also conducting methodological research on the status of different types of the philosophy of religion and its relation to other religiologic disciplines. She has supervised over 1000 master thesis and many doctoral thesis. She has been an author of more than 200 scicntific publications. Her major work on the philosophy of religion was published in English, too: „Person and religion: an in troduction to the philosophy of religion, trans. by Theresa Sandok, New York i in.: Peter Lang 1991.Pozycja Ciągłość i rozwój. Osiemdziesiąt lat filozofii na KUL-uJaneczek, Stanisław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The paper presents an outline of the history of the philosophical faculty at the KUL both in the perspective of the function of philosophy as a discipline which has a formative character, and is studied by students of all faculties in order to build the foundations of the Christian attitude and for their formal education, and – first of all – as a research centre. Attention is especially paid to the dynamics of developing the methods of philosophising. It started with Louvain Thomism dominating in the period between the two world wars, passed through the influences of traditional Thomism, to showing more fully the specificity of existential Thomism. It is characteristic of the Lublin philosophical school (formed by S. Swieżawski, J. Kalinowski, M. A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, K. Wojtyła; and in the next generation – Z. J. Zdybicka, A. B. Stępień. T. Styczeń). It recurs to the ideals of the classical way of practising philosophy, first of all formulating a realistic conception of reality. However, it does so, leading a discussion with the whole of the philosophical hcritage (especially critically using the achievements of phenomenology and analytical philosophy and treating the history of philosophy as sort of philosophical laboratory) and using the tools of modern methodology and logic. Moreover, it stresses the autonomy of philosophy and its independence of ideology and scientistically understood research. In the aspect of interest in particular branches of philosophy this meant a change Irom stressing the role of metaphysics to a broader development of anthropology and philosophy of the law, philosophy of God and religion, and finally – personalistic ethics. Next attention is drawn to the share of the Lublin circle in the international and Polish philosophical movement, especially with respect to organisation of congresses, conferences and symposia, membership of particular scholars in philosophical associations, and their participation in the editorial staffs of periodicals. Finally some philosophical publications, typical of the Lublin circle, especially in congress languages are mentioned.Pozycja Doświadczenie Boga?Moskal, Piotr (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Pozycja Emmanuel Levinas - filozof wyróżnionyWeksler-Waszkinel, Romuald Jakub (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)It is a fact, that John Paul II who may be jusily called a philosopher-Pope – in his book “Przekroczyć próg nadziei” (“To cross the threshold of hope”) singles out the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. The present atricle that consists of two parts shows the reasons for this. John Paul II, like the French philosopher, considers that a complete confinement within the bounds of reason – the culture of immanence – results in sick democracies, and ultimately in totalitarianisms (part I). The experience of our century and millennium, coming to their ends, points to the fact that reason needs faith. The Peter of our times thinks that contemporary culture needs the God of the Bible, it needs personalism stemming from the Bible, whose distinguished representative is E. Levinas (part 2).Pozycja Glosa do tematu religii. Siostrze profesor Zofii Józefie Zdybickiej z gratulacjami na dzień jubileuszuGogacz, Mieczysław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Pozycja Jana Pawła II wizja integralnej godności ludzkiejDec, Ignacy (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The author in his article sheds light on a very important topic of John Paul II’s teaching which is the dignity of the human person. The article consists of three parts. In the first one reasons for rejecting the truth of the dignity of the human person in the contemporary times are presented. In the second one the author speaks about the natural dignity of man and its ontological foundations arc underlined. These foundations are: self-consciousness (an ability of intellectual perception), freedom (an ability of self-determination) and love (an ability of becoming a gift to another man). The third part of the article is dedicated to showing the sources of the supernatural human dignity. Man as God’s image is taken here in consideration by presenting the human dignity revealed in the moment of Creation and then „supplemented” in the mystery of the incarnation and Redemption. This natural and supernatural human dignity forms a basis for a special honor that is due to a human person. This is why „man is the first and the most fundamental way on which the Church should walk in fulfilling her ministry, is the first and the most fundamental way of the Church” (RH 14).Pozycja John Dewey and Richard Rorty on Theism and ReligionGutowski, Piotr (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)W artykule Stanowisko Johna Deweya i Richarda Rorty’ego w kwestii religii i teizmu przedstawiono najpierw rozwój poglądów Deweya na ten temat. Wychowany w rodzinie chrześcijańskiej, był on z początku pozytywnie nastawiony do teizmu i religii, ale już wówczas pojmował Boga jako wcielonego w Ludzkość i praktycznie z nią się utożsamiającego. Z biegiem czasu humanistyczny naturalizm, uzupełniony o deklarowany przez Deweya racjonalizm, wziął górę nad teizmem. Dewey zachował jednak terminologię teistyczną, która sprawia, że niekiedy błędnie bierze się go za obrońcę teizmu i religii. Rorty uważa siebie za kontynuatora myśli Deweya, ale zdaje się zasadniczo od niego różnić, ponieważ odrzuca racjonalizm i wprost głosi relatywizm. Racjonalizm Deweya niewiele jednak ma wspólnego z klasyczną logiką. Jest on raczej generalizacją na wszelkie procesy społeczne Darwinowskiej idei przypadkowych zmian w walce o przetrwanie. Rorty akceptuje tę samą ideę, lecz słusznie odrzuca dla niej nazwę „racjonalizm”. Podobnie jest w kwestii religii i teizmu. Mimo różnic terminologicznych Rorty zasadniczo nie wychodzi poza Deweyowski kult Ludzkości, który w głębszej warstwie jest u obu tych filozofów kultem wszechobecnego Przypadku.Pozycja La questione del realismoPossenti, Vittorio (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Autor zwraca uwagę na antyrealistyczne tendencje występujące w filozofii współczesnej: analitycznej, hermeneutycznej, neopozytywistycznej i w etyce. Filozofia ta ma charakter idealistyczny. Wywodzi się z kartezjańskiej zasady „cogito, ergo sum” i prowadzi do eliminacji (koncepcji) prawdy. Fałszywie stawia problem realizmu. Właściwy realizm krytyczny (klasyczny) uznaje fundamentalną zasadę egzystencjalnej niezależności rzeczy od myślenia, nietożsamości esse i percipi; sądzi według przedmiotu.Pozycja Lepiej jest milczeć i być, niż gadać i nie istnieć (filozoficzno-medytacyjne uwagi o milczeniu)Sochoń, Jan (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The article presents the role of silence in European culture in the context of common parlance. The following forms of silence have been distinguished: amorous, treacherous, political, and the silence of faith. It proves that silence remains an indispensable element in man’s recognizing of his place in the world. Therefore it should be treated as an act of liberation. Unfortunately, nowadays people do not try to use the gift of silence also in the religious sense, although God, whom we can reach, spoke and still speaks through his eternal world – Truth and no futile post-modern fortune-telling will dissuade us from the indicated hope.Pozycja Les tendances humanistes dans la philosophie polonaise aux XVe et XVIe sieclesCzerkawski, Jan (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Narodzinom humanizmu w kulturze polskiej poświęcono wiele studiów. W artykule skoncentrowano się na ukazaniu zmian w nauczaniu filozofii na Uniwersytecie Krakowskim od końca wieku XV do połowy wieku XVI. W wieku XV oraz w pierwszym dwudziestoleciu XVI wieku można mówić o pokojowej koegzystencji scholastyki i humanizmu na krakowskiej uczelni. Domeną ówczesnych scholastyków była logika i filozofia przyrody. Uniwersyteccy zwolennicy litterae humaniores interesowali się głównie gramatyką, retoryką, epistolografią i poezją. Studia literackie i scholastyczne nie były traktowane jako konkurencyjne systemy nauczania. Dopiero od połowy lat dwudziestych XVI w. zaczynają pojawiać się oznaki wyraźnych konfliktów między zwolennikami wykształcenia scholastycznego i humanistycznego. Humanizm stopniowo przybierał postać określonej doktryny z własną, różną od scholastycznej, koncepcją uprawiania filozofii. Tej znaczącej ewolucji humanizmu towarzyszył proces stagnacji scholastyki. Postępujący proces recepcji literatury starożytnej oraz wpływ twórczości zagranicznych humanistów – przede wszystkim Erazma z Rotterdamu – powodował zmianę poglądów na temat tego, co jest w kulturze ważne. Skutki owego przewartościowania nie były dla filozofii jednoznacznie korzystne. Filozoficzny praktycyzm humanistów łatwo skłaniał do lekceważenia ściśle poznawczych zadań filozofii.Pozycja Logiczne relacje między moralnymi kwalifikacjami czynów ze względu na przykazania i radyHerbut, Józef (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Many moral (and juridical) systems are based on three evaluations of human behaviours: obligatory, forbidden, indifferent. The logical relationship between them can be illustrated using deontological hexagon. It is clear that supererogatory action is not adequately reflected in the three-dimensional framework. R. M. Chisholm (building on some ideas A. Meinong’s) deveioped a five-dimensional evaluative framework for the analysis of the human morality. He classifies actions as „obligatory”, „forbidden”, „indifferent”, „supererogatory”, „offensive” . However, that conceptual system is not totally consistent since „non-offensive” cannot be identified with the disjunction of „obligatory”, „forbidden”, „indifferent”, „supererogatory”. A complete and logical consistent systematization of our moral evaluations of actions can be obtained if we differentiate between coercive prescriptions (praecepta) and non-coercive advises (consilia). One must further differentiate between positive and negative prescriptions on the one hand, and on the other between positive advises („exhortations") and negative advises („dehortations”). In this way we have four evaluations of actions: „obligatory”, „forbidden”, „exhorted”, „dehorted”. Adding to these concepts „indifferent” and after that – their negations, we obtain ten evaluative concepts. The logical relations among them cam be illustrated with deontological decagon.Pozycja Moralne aspekty postępu nauk biomedycznych: dylematy stare czy nowe?Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The essence of the dilemmas of the development of biomedical sciences lies in the problem of human freedom. The question is whether the genetic research, going ever deeper into the human genom, should be stopped or should be prolongated in the name of freedom of science. The scientific development creates not only threats but also new opportunities of curing diseases so far incurable. So we ought not to regard the scientific development as wrongful in itself. The good of the person however should be always its end and final criteria.Pozycja Niektóre negatywne cechy współczesnej kultury i ich uzasadnieniaMorawiec, Edmund (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)he author points to three negative trends that are manifest in various fields of contemporary culture and that prove its crisis. They are secularisation, desacralisation and dechristianisation. In these trends certain negative human attitudes are revealed: naturalism in interpreting all phenomena, liberalism and anarchism in thinking and acting, relativism and consumptionism. These attitudes are transformed into peculiar ideologies ruling cultural life. The foundation of the crisis of the contemporary culture is man, the human esse, furnished with improper attitudes and systems of values (especially departure from the truth and good). The source of the departure from the absolute values is methodological empiricism, rationalism with its apriorism and analytical philosophy, existentialism and post-modernism. The paper is concluded with the proposition that it is necessary to return to classical philosophy in order to „heal” contemporary culture.Pozycja Normatywna moc prawdySzostek, Andrzej (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The basic thesis in the article says that the truth has a normative authority. In his considerations the author first of all tries to follow St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought. St. Thomas stressed more strongly than other thinkers the various meanings of the binding power of the truth. although the idea of „the ethics of being faithful to the truth” (mainly discussed in §3) is contained in contained rather in St. Thomas’ system implicitly and not expressed explicitly. Taking into consideration Cardinal K. Wojtyła’s work is very helpful in making it explicit. The author shows the sense of the basic theses on three planes. First (§1) he analyses St. Thomas’ definition of truthfulness and discusses its rank and range, as opposed to various kinds of lies, and especially he looks for motives that made both St. Augustine and St. Thomas evaluate every kind of lie very negatively. Next (§2) he analyses a deeper meaning of „the truth as a virtue”, that is closer to the modern postulate of an authentic life. This, however, in St. Thomas’ work, finds its ultimate foundation in God, which reveals a deeper sense of righteousness as an expression of being faithful to the truth. The last part of the considerations (§3) is devoted to an explanation of the question: in what sense and why does any cognitive act by which one learns the truth carry a moral charge with it – a charge so strong that departure from the truth, even most banal, inevitably harms the subject itself that is a rational being.Pozycja Platona krytyka ateizmuDłubacz, Włodzimierz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Pozycja Prawda minimalna a realizm metafizycznySzubka, Tadeusz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)In recent discussions about truth it is common to oppose the traditional substantial theories of truth, including correspondence theory and various epistemic accounts, to the so-called minimalist conceptions of truth. According to minimalism although truth is a genuine property ascribed to propositions, statements, or sentences, the notion of truth is by itself a rather simple and uncontroversial concept, defined by a set of platitudes, among which the crucial role is played by the equivalence scheme T: the proposition that p is true if and only if p. This paper presents three different minimalist conceptions of truth, put forward respectively by P. Horwich, C. Wright, and W. P. Alston. In spite of important disagreements among those three thinkers, they agree that the notion of truth is a metaphysically lightweight notion, that is, it is not embedded in a set of metaphysical presuppositions, and its application does not entail any significant metaphysical consequences. If this is indeed so, then the notion of truth, its fundamental role notwithstanding, is not a philosophically interesting and fruitful concept.Pozycja Problem definicji sztukiKiereś, Henryk (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)In the article it is proved that the discussion that is nowadays going on between the so called essentialism and anti-essentialism on the question of (a possibility of) an essential definition of art, is corrupted with historical ignorance and misunderstandings. Anti-essentialist criticism of the tradition is in many cases sound, but anti-essentialism itself propagates propositions that are internally contradictory, inconsistent with experience and „sanctioning" relativism in the theory of art and in art itself. Against this background the classical definition of art is reminded (Aristotle, St. Thomas Aąuinas) and the proper solution of the problem of defining art is outlined as well as of the problem of the criterion for evaluating artistic output (that is sometimes mistaken for the former one).Pozycja Problem realizmu w etyce Antonio RosminiegoWierzbicki, Alfred (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Antonio Rosmini undertakes the problem of realism in ethics in connection with the crisis caused on the one hand by empiricism and utilitarianism which results from it, and on the other hand by aprioristic rationalism leading to subjectivism and relativism. The author of the article revises the view that Rosmini’s ethics is a version of I. Kant’s ethics. Such an opinion does not sufficiently take into consideration Rosmini complex relation to Kantian attempt at justification of moral duty. Rosmini’s work „I principi della scienza morale” is not a polemics with Kant’s philosophy of morality, as criticism of Kant ’s views is undertaken in the context of positive research on the essence of morality and its ontological foundations, hence Rosmini also positively appraises Kant's intuitions. He shows that both empiricism and rationalism do not construct ethical theories on the basis of complete data of an experiment (osservazione imparziale ed intera). This leads to empirical ethics claiming that the contents of moral duty have the features of the subject of morality: accidentality and changeability, whereas rationalism transfers the features of morał law to the subject and makes it an absolute being. After Kant Rosmini accepts methodological separation of ethics from eudaemonology because o f their two different formal objects. Ethics deals with objective good, and eudeaemonology with subjective good related to the needs of the subject. This allows overcoming the naturalist mistake in ethics. However, he explains the categorical character of the moral imperative in a way different from Kant’s. The rules of morality are not facts of the reason but they may be realistically found out as the laws of reality. Being and the truth are notions on the basis of which both realistic metaphysics and realistic ethics are built.Pozycja Redukcjonizm pragmatyczny jako wersja współczesnej rewolucji w aksjologiiŻyciński, Józef (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The author subjects to criticism the anti-intellectualistic conception of man as animal pragmaticum and he defends the humanity's rationalist heritage that is to a large degree inspired by the proposition that man – created in God's image – shows his similarity to the Creator by reflexive, rational and free actions. The author points to a necessity to refer in the cultural-social space to a transcendental basis of values, to the foundation of moral values, to the order of good and truth, and he warns against the dangers that are brought by a purely pragmatic approach in which the main role is played by legal regulations and actions that have an institutional-administrative character.