Roczniki Filozoficzne, 1999, T. 47, z. 2
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Pozycja „Ale nam się porobiło”Gałkowski, Jerzy W. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The paper is a brief commentary John Poul II’s address delivered in the Polish parliament, on 11th June 1999.Pozycja Problem realizmu w etyce Antonio RosminiegoWierzbicki, Alfred (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Antonio Rosmini undertakes the problem of realism in ethics in connection with the crisis caused on the one hand by empiricism and utilitarianism which results from it, and on the other hand by aprioristic rationalism leading to subjectivism and relativism. The author of the article revises the view that Rosmini’s ethics is a version of I. Kant’s ethics. Such an opinion does not sufficiently take into consideration Rosmini complex relation to Kantian attempt at justification of moral duty. Rosmini’s work „I principi della scienza morale” is not a polemics with Kant’s philosophy of morality, as criticism of Kant ’s views is undertaken in the context of positive research on the essence of morality and its ontological foundations, hence Rosmini also positively appraises Kant's intuitions. He shows that both empiricism and rationalism do not construct ethical theories on the basis of complete data of an experiment (osservazione imparziale ed intera). This leads to empirical ethics claiming that the contents of moral duty have the features of the subject of morality: accidentality and changeability, whereas rationalism transfers the features of morał law to the subject and makes it an absolute being. After Kant Rosmini accepts methodological separation of ethics from eudaemonology because o f their two different formal objects. Ethics deals with objective good, and eudeaemonology with subjective good related to the needs of the subject. This allows overcoming the naturalist mistake in ethics. However, he explains the categorical character of the moral imperative in a way different from Kant’s. The rules of morality are not facts of the reason but they may be realistically found out as the laws of reality. Being and the truth are notions on the basis of which both realistic metaphysics and realistic ethics are built.Pozycja Glosa do tematu religii. Siostrze profesor Zofii Józefie Zdybickiej z gratulacjami na dzień jubileuszuGogacz, Mieczysław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Pozycja Stanisław Kamiński – filozof, metodolog i historyk naukiBronk, Andrzej; Majdański, Stanisław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)S. Kamiński (1919-1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and science historian. His main fields of interest were: history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. He, saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics. He gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology). He investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, modern history of the theory of definition (Th. Hobbes, B. Pascal, J. Locke, E. B. de Condillac, J. D. Gergonne), the theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, the deductive method (B. Pascal, G. W. Leibniz, G. Frege), the achievements of logie and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of S. Kamiński's philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He looked to history for inspiration, for how to solve his own problems and for a partial confirmation of legitimacy of his answers. He also used history to better understand the context of the discussed problems. His methodological interests are characterized by a philosophical and historical approach. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. He cultivated the ideal of rational knowledge. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as being ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge and distinguished (with Kant) a material and formal part of knowledge, assuming that the formal element manifests itself as the logical form in the formal procedures of the (scientific) cognitive processes, that is in the (scientific) method and the (scientific) language. Making many attempts at a methodological characterization of different types of cognition and knowledge he distinguished - besides commonsense knowledge that lies at the bottom of any other type of knowledge - the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge. None of them can be reduced to other type of knowledge, because each of them has its own problems, goals and methods. At the top there is a kind of sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. S. Kamiński indebted his understanding of science to contemporary philosophy and to the classical philosophy. The nature of science was determined by him from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science is concerned with, i.e. what is ifs subject matter, is a philosophical question, it presupposes an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. S. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world but so are subjective states of man and products of his mind and his language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Also here - rejecting the scientism (i.e. the view, that the scientific method and knowledge is the pattern and the measure of each knowledge) - S. Kamiński takes a pluralistic attitude. Accepting that the scientific method is not simple, that there is not one uncomplicated ideal way of doing science, and that because of the multiplicity of questions and scientific aims it would be difficult to construct one universal scientific method as a uniform set of rules for every kind of science, S. Kamiński assumes that different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. One manifestation of S. Kamiński's methodological pluralism is his antinaturalistic position in the theory of the humanities where he supported the thesis of their methodological autonomy with regard to natural sciences. Closer to the philosophical cognition and knowledge, the humanities do not meet and can not meet the conditions imposed upon the natural sciences, as they differ from them in subject matter (the world of culture) and hence in method (understanding, interpretation) used. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life he published three books: Gergonne'a teoria definicji [Gergonne's Theory of Definition). Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 1981; and [together with M. A. Krąpiec] Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992; vol. V: Światopogląd – Religia – Teologia [Worldview – Religion – Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998.Pozycja Wychowanie religijne w świetle myśli Karola WojtyłyOlbrycht, Katarzyna (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The text is an attempt at defining the essence of religious education as a special field of educational activity, and also it is a suggestion for interpretation of religious education with respect to the Catholic religion. By „religious education” the author understands supporting a man’s personal development, which would make more profound his ability for religious life, life directed to the sacred, to God. This ability, by means of educational activities, may be developed into the attitude, which accepts the truth about God and the world and man created by God. Then the truth is introduced into one’s life as the centre that organises the world and all the actions of man who gives them order and sense. A practical consequence of putting this ability and attitude into effect is living one’s life „in the presence of God”. The religious education of Catholics should take into consideration the teachings of the Vatican Council II whose acceptance requires formation of attitudes that the author reminds by referring to K. Wojtyła’s text „At the Foundations of Revival”. A Christian's basic attitude is the attitude of mission and testimony as an existential expression of faith. This attitude is then substantiated in several particular attitudes, namely, the attitudes of: participation, human identity and Christian responsibility, the ecumenical attitude and an apostolic one.Pozycja La questione del realismoPossenti, Vittorio (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Autor zwraca uwagę na antyrealistyczne tendencje występujące w filozofii współczesnej: analitycznej, hermeneutycznej, neopozytywistycznej i w etyce. Filozofia ta ma charakter idealistyczny. Wywodzi się z kartezjańskiej zasady „cogito, ergo sum” i prowadzi do eliminacji (koncepcji) prawdy. Fałszywie stawia problem realizmu. Właściwy realizm krytyczny (klasyczny) uznaje fundamentalną zasadę egzystencjalnej niezależności rzeczy od myślenia, nietożsamości esse i percipi; sądzi według przedmiotu.Pozycja Emmanuel Levinas - filozof wyróżnionyWeksler-Waszkinel, Romuald Jakub (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)It is a fact, that John Paul II who may be jusily called a philosopher-Pope – in his book “Przekroczyć próg nadziei” (“To cross the threshold of hope”) singles out the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. The present atricle that consists of two parts shows the reasons for this. John Paul II, like the French philosopher, considers that a complete confinement within the bounds of reason – the culture of immanence – results in sick democracies, and ultimately in totalitarianisms (part I). The experience of our century and millennium, coming to their ends, points to the fact that reason needs faith. The Peter of our times thinks that contemporary culture needs the God of the Bible, it needs personalism stemming from the Bible, whose distinguished representative is E. Levinas (part 2).Pozycja Prawda minimalna a realizm metafizycznySzubka, Tadeusz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)In recent discussions about truth it is common to oppose the traditional substantial theories of truth, including correspondence theory and various epistemic accounts, to the so-called minimalist conceptions of truth. According to minimalism although truth is a genuine property ascribed to propositions, statements, or sentences, the notion of truth is by itself a rather simple and uncontroversial concept, defined by a set of platitudes, among which the crucial role is played by the equivalence scheme T: the proposition that p is true if and only if p. This paper presents three different minimalist conceptions of truth, put forward respectively by P. Horwich, C. Wright, and W. P. Alston. In spite of important disagreements among those three thinkers, they agree that the notion of truth is a metaphysically lightweight notion, that is, it is not embedded in a set of metaphysical presuppositions, and its application does not entail any significant metaphysical consequences. If this is indeed so, then the notion of truth, its fundamental role notwithstanding, is not a philosophically interesting and fruitful concept.Pozycja Lepiej jest milczeć i być, niż gadać i nie istnieć (filozoficzno-medytacyjne uwagi o milczeniu)Sochoń, Jan (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The article presents the role of silence in European culture in the context of common parlance. The following forms of silence have been distinguished: amorous, treacherous, political, and the silence of faith. It proves that silence remains an indispensable element in man’s recognizing of his place in the world. Therefore it should be treated as an act of liberation. Unfortunately, nowadays people do not try to use the gift of silence also in the religious sense, although God, whom we can reach, spoke and still speaks through his eternal world – Truth and no futile post-modern fortune-telling will dissuade us from the indicated hope.Pozycja Normatywna moc prawdySzostek, Andrzej (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The basic thesis in the article says that the truth has a normative authority. In his considerations the author first of all tries to follow St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought. St. Thomas stressed more strongly than other thinkers the various meanings of the binding power of the truth. although the idea of „the ethics of being faithful to the truth” (mainly discussed in §3) is contained in contained rather in St. Thomas’ system implicitly and not expressed explicitly. Taking into consideration Cardinal K. Wojtyła’s work is very helpful in making it explicit. The author shows the sense of the basic theses on three planes. First (§1) he analyses St. Thomas’ definition of truthfulness and discusses its rank and range, as opposed to various kinds of lies, and especially he looks for motives that made both St. Augustine and St. Thomas evaluate every kind of lie very negatively. Next (§2) he analyses a deeper meaning of „the truth as a virtue”, that is closer to the modern postulate of an authentic life. This, however, in St. Thomas’ work, finds its ultimate foundation in God, which reveals a deeper sense of righteousness as an expression of being faithful to the truth. The last part of the considerations (§3) is devoted to an explanation of the question: in what sense and why does any cognitive act by which one learns the truth carry a moral charge with it – a charge so strong that departure from the truth, even most banal, inevitably harms the subject itself that is a rational being.Pozycja Platona krytyka ateizmuDłubacz, Włodzimierz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Pozycja Bibliografia prac s. prof. dr hab. Zofii Józefy ZdybickiejPtaszek, Robert T. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Professor, Sister Zofia J. Zdybicka has been a head of the Philosophy of Religion Department at Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) since 1973. She undertook her studies on the Department of Christian Philosophy of KUL in 1956 and continued them until 1961. In 1965 she defended her doctoral thesis on „Philosophical grounds of cognizability of God according to Henri de Lubac”. She became Assistant Professor in 1970 with her habilitation thesis „The participation of being. A trial on understanding the relation belween God and the world”. She received tuition at Catholic University of Louvain (1972), Leuven (1981), and Yale University (New Haven – USA 1977/78). In the years of 1980-1984 she was a head of Theoretical Philosophy Section. She has been a Dean of the Department of Christian Philosophy of KUL since 1990 up to the present moment. She is a member of the Research Council of John Paul II Institute and a member of Episcopal Council for Culture. She has been Mother Superior of the Centre of Lublin Order of the Ursulan Sister of the Heart of the Dying Jesus. She is a representative of the Lublin Philosophical School, an author of the holistic interpretation of the religious fact in the sphere of classical philosophy of being, which makes philosophy of religion an independent branch of research in the system of realistic philosophy. Her interests are revolvinground the problems connected with God (participation theory, the problem of God cognition, etc.). Apart from historical and systematic considerations she has been also conducting methodological research on the status of different types of the philosophy of religion and its relation to other religiologic disciplines. She has supervised over 1000 master thesis and many doctoral thesis. She has been an author of more than 200 scicntific publications. Her major work on the philosophy of religion was published in English, too: „Person and religion: an in troduction to the philosophy of religion, trans. by Theresa Sandok, New York i in.: Peter Lang 1991.Pozycja The Genesis and History of ius gentium in the Ancient World and the Middle AgesWielgus, Stanisław (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Ius gentium sięga swoimi korzeniami czasów prehistorycznych. Związane było wówczas z wierzeniami religijnymi i opartymi na nich obyczajami. Przekonanie jednak wcześniejszych autorów, wyrażone chociażby przez Monteskiusza, jakoby wszystkie ludy stosowały prawo narodów, w świetle współczesnych badań okazuje się błędne. W wielu kulturach takie prawo nie występowało. U niektórych prymitywnych narodów jeszcze dziś „obcy” traktowany jest z zasady jak „nieczłowiek". Prawo narodów stosowali jednak już w czwartym tysiącleciu przed Chrystusem Sumerowie. Występuje ono również w starożytnych kulturach Babilonii. Egiptu, Indii i Chin. Starożytni Grecy stosowali je tylko do tych ludzi, z którymi łączył ich wspólny język, kult religijny, igrzyska olimpijskie itp. Niegreków traktowali jako naturalnych wrogów. Rozwój i precyzacja ius gentium dokonały się w starożytnym Rzymie, gdy stał się imperium o światowym zasięgu i wchłonął liczne narody. Prawo to obejmowało zespół norm regulujących prawne stosunki między Rzymianami a obcymi. Z biegiem czasu ulegało ewolucji. Gaius (II w. po Chr.) rozróżnił ius civile – prawo ustanowione przez określony naród dla siebie - od ius gentium, tj. prawa ustanowionego przez wszystkich ludzi w oparciu o naturalny rozum (naturalis ratio). Rozróżnienie powyższe przyjęli i rozwinęli prawnicy średniowieczni, którzy ius gentium uznali za synonim prawa uniwersalnego. Przyjmując z greckiej tradycji rozróżnienie między ius gentium a ius naturae, liczni autorzy rzymscy, zwłaszcza stoicy (Cycero, Marek Aureliusz), a także wcześni Ojcowie Kościoła, utożsamiali prawo narodów z prawem natury. Byli jednak także tacy, którzy te dwa prawa sobie przeciwstawiali (Ulpianus, †228), stwierdzając, że ius gentium dotyczy wyłącznie rodzaju ludzkiego, podczas gdy ius naturae rozciąga się na wszystkie żywe istoty. Po upadku Zachodniego Cesarstwa Rzymskiego Kościół rozwinął system prawny zwany prawem kanonicznym. Nie było ono ani prawem narodowym, ani międzynarodowym. Miało charakter prawa ponadnarodowego, dotyczącego wszystkich chrześcijan. Ze względu na uniwersalny - politycznie i społecznie - charakter ówczesnego Kościoła, prawo kanoniczne regulowało nie tylko życie wewnątrzkościelne, lecz także stosunki międzynarodowe, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do wojny i pokoju. Kościół wykorzystywał prawo kanoniczne i sankcje, które mu ono dawało, do łagodzenia obyczajów i do eliminacji różnego rodzaju wojen, w tym zwłaszcza tzw. wojen prywatnych, które stanowiły szczególnie dotkliwą plagę średniowiecznych społeczeństw Zachodniej Europy. W tym celu pod karą ekskomuniki proklamował tzw. Boży pokój i zakazywał używania do walki broni szczególnie groźnej i podstępnej, a mianowicie kusz i łuków. Średniowieczne ius gentium było więc głęboko zakorzenione w prawie kanonicznym, chociaż pozostawało również pod dużym wpływem chrześcijańskich teorii teologicznych i filozoficznych. Myślicielami. którzy wywarli znaczący wpływ na jego oblicze i rozwój, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do tzw. doktryny wojny sprawiedliwej oraz do pokoju między narodami, byli: św. Augustyn, Tertulian, Orygenes oraz Izydor z Sewilli ( f 636), który zmodyfikował Gaiusową definicję ius gentium, dodając, że uniwersalność prawa narodów będzie zachowana, jeśli zaakceptują je „prawie" wszystkie narody. Ius gentium w ujęciu Izydora obejmowało nie tylko sprawy wojny i pokoju, lecz także takie zagadnienia, jak tworzenie i zbrojenie baz wojskowych, niewola, przymierze, układ pokojowy, zawieszenie broni, nietykalność posłów itp. Ujęcie Izydora włączone zostało do Dekretu Gracjana (1150). Franciszkańscy uczeni średniowieczni, podejmujący rozważania na ten temat (np. Aleksander z Hales i Bonawentura), nawiązywali do myśli św. Augustyna. Dominującą jednak w XIII w. opcją stała się teoria ius gentium w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu, który korzystając z teorii prawa narodów św. Augustyna oraz Izydora z Sewilli, wniósł do niej nowe ujęcie, a doktrynę wojny sprawiedliwej wprowadził na stale do teologii moralnej. Korzystając z dorobku swoich poprzedników, tematem wojny sprawiedliwej zajmowali się w sposób szczególny następujący autorzy średniowieczni: Rajmund z Pennafort, Wilhelm z Rennes, papież Innocenty IV, Henryk de Segusio (Hostiensis), Marcin Polak z Opawy, Oldradus de Ponte, Ioannes de Lignano, Bartolus, Baldus, Idzi Rzymianin, Augustyn z Ankony, Dante, Wilhelm Ockham, Marsyliusz z Padwy, Jan Quidort, Piotr Dubois i inni. Godna szczególnej uwagi jest kontrowersja na temat wojny oraz traktowania przez chrześcijan pogan i innych niewiernych, która to kontrowersja wystąpiła między Innocentym IV - przyznającym niechrześcijanom takie same prawa, jakie mają chrześcijanie – a Henrykiem de Segusio, który uważał, że poganie nie mają prawa do posiadania rodziny, własności prywatnej i własnego państwa. Trzeba zaznaczyć, że polscy średniowieczni uczeni (Stanisław ze Skarbimierza, Paweł Włodkowic i inni) jednoznacznie opowiadali się za stanowiskiem Innocentego IV. Duże znaczenie dla rozwoju średniowiecznego ius gentium miały także różne teorie usiłujące rozwiązać kwestię określenia właściwej relacji między Kościołem a Cesarstwem, papieżem a cesarzem. W XIV w. opracowano trzy główne teorie na ten temat: opcję papieską (Idzi Rzymianin, Augustyn de Ancona), przyznającą papieżowi absolutną władzę duchową i świecką; opcję Dantego, prezentującą ideologię Hohenstaufów poszukującą równowagi między władzą papieża i cesarza; oraz opcję Ockhama i Marsyliusza z Padwy, przyznających całą władzę świecką narodowi, a duchowną wspólnocie wiernych. Interesujący wkład do teorii prawa narodów wniósł także Piotr z Dubois (†1312), który domagał się ustanowienia powszechnego pokoju w obrębie całego chrześcijaństwa. Pokój ten winien zapewnić specjalny trybunał powołany przez specjalnie zwołany sobór, w którym winni wziąć udział wszyscy liczący się dostojnicy chrześcijańscy – zarówno kościelni, jak i świeccy.Pozycja Wolność w horyzoncie prawdy. W sprawie filozoficznych podstaw teologii moralnejStyczeń, Tadeusz (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)A concise answer to the question: „What does it mean to be free?” asked at the beginning of the present paper may be – as result of the discussion – briefly formulated as follows: Only the freedom of a subject who is obedient to the – recognised by him – objective truth is real freedom. In other words, the subject confirms himself as a free one, i.e. remains himself, as one who is dependent on himself, always and only, when with the act of his own free choice he confirms the truth recognised by his own cognitive act – although it is independent of him. And in this sense only the truth – recognised by the subject with his own cognitive act and by the same act accepted as such (but at the same time independent of him) – may through the act of being chosen, confirm and fulfil the subject in his integral identity (selfness), or „liberate” him. It is precisely in this sense that Jesus Christ most concisely defined the relation between freedom and the truth in his words: „And you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free" (John 8:32).Pozycja Religia w Zofii Józefy Zdybickiej filozoficznym wyjaśnianiuKrąpiec, Mieczysław A. (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Sister Professor Zofia Józefa Zdybicka, an Ursuline SJK, for a long time Dean of the Faculty ot Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, concentrates her philosophical research on the problems of God and his relations with the world, and especially on the problems of religion and its connections with other branches of culture. In her most important book. „Człowiek i religia”, published many times and translated into English (Person and Religion), she presents a unique – on the world scale – realistic interpretation of the fact of religion. Her interpretation is directed by understanding of the objectively existing fact of religion, and not only by its subjective experiencing – as in the traditional post-Kantian philosophy. In Zdybicka’s view religion is a real, personal relation of a human person to a real personal Absolute that exists beyond the subjcct. The sufficient condition for religion is on the one hand the real exislence of God beyond the subject, God that is the intentional, model and causative reason of the world; and on the other the human person's status as an entity, a being that is accidental and limited, but at the same time transcending the world of nature and culture, open to what is absolute, desiring a fuli and lasting happiness.Pozycja Problem definicji sztukiKiereś, Henryk (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)In the article it is proved that the discussion that is nowadays going on between the so called essentialism and anti-essentialism on the question of (a possibility of) an essential definition of art, is corrupted with historical ignorance and misunderstandings. Anti-essentialist criticism of the tradition is in many cases sound, but anti-essentialism itself propagates propositions that are internally contradictory, inconsistent with experience and „sanctioning" relativism in the theory of art and in art itself. Against this background the classical definition of art is reminded (Aristotle, St. Thomas Aąuinas) and the proper solution of the problem of defining art is outlined as well as of the problem of the criterion for evaluating artistic output (that is sometimes mistaken for the former one).Pozycja Doświadczenie Boga?Moskal, Piotr (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)Pozycja Niektóre negatywne cechy współczesnej kultury i ich uzasadnieniaMorawiec, Edmund (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)he author points to three negative trends that are manifest in various fields of contemporary culture and that prove its crisis. They are secularisation, desacralisation and dechristianisation. In these trends certain negative human attitudes are revealed: naturalism in interpreting all phenomena, liberalism and anarchism in thinking and acting, relativism and consumptionism. These attitudes are transformed into peculiar ideologies ruling cultural life. The foundation of the crisis of the contemporary culture is man, the human esse, furnished with improper attitudes and systems of values (especially departure from the truth and good). The source of the departure from the absolute values is methodological empiricism, rationalism with its apriorism and analytical philosophy, existentialism and post-modernism. The paper is concluded with the proposition that it is necessary to return to classical philosophy in order to „heal” contemporary culture.Pozycja Religia a filozofia. Przyczynek do problematyki źródła religiiJaworski, Marian (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The author of the article unclcrtakes the problem of the source of religion from the point of view of man's experiences. Antoni B. Stępień maintains that the source of religion is the same in its kind as the source of philosophy. This attitude is partly shared by Zofia Zdybycka, however, she also sees the necessity of revelation. Arno Anzenbacher has a different point of view. The essence of religion comprises the fact that man is sure that the divine foundation of the sense by itself has become manifest and possible to experience. The author of the article sees a solution to the problem in turning towards analysis of what the religious consciousness brings with it. Hence he refers to the analyses by the phenomenologists of religion: Max Scheler, Albert Lange and others, as well as to analyses by phenomenologists of religion in a historical perspective – especially by Mircea Eliade. On the basis of these analyses the author expresses the view that religious life starts with experiencing – in any form – the „sacred”, the „divine” element, which tries to meet man.Pozycja Moralne aspekty postępu nauk biomedycznych: dylematy stare czy nowe?Chyrowicz, Barbara (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999)The essence of the dilemmas of the development of biomedical sciences lies in the problem of human freedom. The question is whether the genetic research, going ever deeper into the human genom, should be stopped or should be prolongated in the name of freedom of science. The scientific development creates not only threats but also new opportunities of curing diseases so far incurable. So we ought not to regard the scientific development as wrongful in itself. The good of the person however should be always its end and final criteria.