Próba reinterpretacji „zakładu” Pascala

Abstract

The traditional version of Pascal’s Wager presented in Penseés has been a subject of multivarious reinterpretations and amendments. The paper presents one of the interpretations revealing elements of pragmatic rationality in choice of Theism. In the approach one emphasizes the point that in the practice of philosophical discourse sophisticated objections could be formulated to any attempt at rational justification of Theism. Even if the thesis of God’s existence were self-evident, its veracity could be questioned on the same way as veracity of human experience concerning free will or immaterial character of the self is questioned in some philosophical currents. Any attempt at argumentation for Theism by taking into consideration either empirical data or fundamental rational principles is a subject to skeptical questioning in which one argues that new principles of rationality and entirely new empirical data could be accepted in a future scientific paradigm. Similar anti-Theistic arguments are unfalsifiable and possess no substantial confirmation, nonetheless, they cannot be excluded from methodological point of view. In this context the form of Pascal’s Wager reinterpreted in terms of calculus of probability brings a rational counterproposal to agnosticism.