Zagadnienie „czystego Ja” w filozofii Edyty Stein

Abstract

In the presented article the author depicts an issue concerning “pure I” in the Philosophical thoughts of Edith Stein. The “pure I” ‒ according to phenomenologists like: E. Husserl, E. Stein ‒ is such an “I” that belongs to each experience such as: “I think”, “I rejoice”, “I suffer” etc., and it is impossible to cross the “I” out from this kind of experience. The author tries to show, that this sort of assertion is a result of failing to take into brackets the influence of language. It is possible to find an experience that belongs to me although it does not outflow from “I”, but the structure of certain languages (e.g. German, English) does not allow putting into words experienced realities. Some languages, instead of helping to describe “what is experienced” adapt realities to their own abilities of description. Further the author shows, that Edith Stein in her Philosophical thought does not stop at the level of “pure I”, but she reaches the “personal I”.